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An intriguing and underexplored set of issues surrounds the 
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painful than other categories of expenses and losses.1 To the extent a 
phenomenon of tax aversion exists, it imposes several kinds of costs 
on society. If people are averse to taxes for reasons above and beyond 
the financial losses the taxes represent, they will likely spend more 
time and money on tax avoidance than a purely economic analysis 
predicts, generating additional deadweight losses for society.2 Even 
when people do not pursue avoidance at elevated levels, tax aversion 
increases the disutility associated with the payment of the tax. Not 
only is this costly in itself,3 but it would also be expected to impact 
compliance rates and enforcement costs by raising the perceived 
benefits of tax evasion relative to the severity and probability of 
punishment.4  
 
 1. See Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1878 
(1994) (“[T]here may be a phenomenon of ‘tax aversion,’ akin to but distinct from loss 
aversion, whereby individuals attach disproportionate disutility to government extractions 
perceived or labeled as ‘taxes.’”). Despite the intuitive resonance of this concept, we have 
uncovered only a handful of studies that use the term “tax aversion.” In those limited instances, 
authors typically employed the phrase “tax aversion” or “tax avoision” to indicate that their 
analysis focused on the overall, added costs and impacts of both illegal “tax evasion” and legal 
“tax avoidance,” without focusing on the concept of disproportionate disutility that we examine 
here. See, e.g., Amy Freedman, Benefiting from Tax Aversion, FIN. SERV. WK. Oct. 15, 1990, at 
27; Roger N. Waud, Tax Aversion, Optimal Tax Rates, and Indexation, 43 PUB. FIN. 310 
(1988); Hans Geeroms & Hendrik Wilmots, An Empirical Model of Tax Evasion and Tax 
Avoidance, 40 PUB. FIN. 190, 203 (1985) (using “avoision” term); Rodney Cross & G.K. Shaw, 
On the Economics of Tax Aversion, 37 PUB. FIN. 36 (1982). The fuller sense in which we mean 
to use the term “tax aversion” is perhaps best captured by the idea of “emotional hazard” 
presented as a possible “new source of efficiency cost of taxation” in Ronald Bosman & Frans 
van Winden, Emotional Hazard in a Power-to-Take Experiment, 112 ECON. J. 147, 149 (2002). 
See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text (discussing the experimental results presented by 
Bosman & van Winden). 
 2. HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 282 (6th ed. 2002) (defining “excess burden” as 
“a loss of welfare above and beyond the tax revenues collected,” and noting that the phrases 
“welfare cost” and “deadweight loss” are also used to denote this cost); David Weisbach, Line-
Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1650-51 (1999) 
(analyzing examples of deadweight loss or excess burden in tax transactions). 
 3. We will later pursue the possibility that disutility associated with taxes might actually 
play a functional role in spurring political action. See Part V.A, infra. Absent such a 
countervailing instrumental role, disutility represents a social loss.  
 4. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169, 183-84 (1968) (presenting an economic model in which the “price” of crime is a 
function of the probability and severity of punishment); Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective 
Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 340 & n.28 (2001) (applying Becker’s analysis that 
“individuals will evade when the expected gain from doing so exceeds the expected penalty” to 
tax evasion); John S. Carroll, Taxation: Compliance with Federal Personal Income Tax Laws, 
in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 507, 510 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer eds., 1992) 
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While there is a general consensus that most people dislike paying 
taxes,5 more empirical data is needed to determine how, and to what 
extent, tax aversion plays a role in taxpayer behavior. If tax aversion 
occurs at significant levels, it becomes important to isolate and 
explore the constitutive elements of that aversion. A better 
understanding of the causes and components of tax aversion could 
spur useful innovation in tax design. In this paper, we survey and 
mine existing bodies of empirical work for the insights they might 
bring to bear on these questions, while constructing a qualitative 
research agenda that begins to fill the remaining gaps. To focus our 
inquiry, we concentrate primarily on the federal income tax.  
This analysis proceeds in five parts. In Part I, we discuss the 
phenomenon of tax aversion and consider the need for further study 
to pinpoint its dimensions, constituent elements, and effects. In Part 
II, we introduce and discuss some of the experimental literature 
involving public goods games while working through some stylized 
examples. Cooperation can break down in experimental group 
contribution settings due to factors like fear and greed—the fear that 
others will not contribute, and the greedy desire to free ride on the 
contributions of others.6 Other factors, like repeat play and social 
proximity of the players, can apparently buffer or counteract these 
negative emotions and help to sustain cooperation.7 Legal scholars 
 
(explaining this “standard economic model” as applied to tax compliance); Michael G. 
Allingham & Agnar Sandomo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. Pub. Econ. 
323 (1972) (formulating static and dynamic economic models for analyzing individual taxpayer 
decisions on whether and how much to evade taxation). 
 5. See, e.g., Frank Newport, Americans Suffer from Negative Mental Attitude While 
Doing Taxes, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, April 2001, at 43, 44 (reporting that 66% of those 
interviewed in a recent survey indicated that they either “dislike” or “hate” paying taxes, and 
that 65% believed the federal income tax they had to pay was “too high”).  
 6. We posit that perhaps more important than either fear or greed in isolation is the fear 
of greed—the concern that the greed of others will go unpunished and that one’s own 
contributions will turn one into a “sucker.” See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text. 
 7. Claudia Keser & Frans van Winden, Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary 
Contributions to Public Goods, 102 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 23, 31 (2000), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID245568_code001011130.pdf?abstractid=245
568 (concluding, based on public goods experiments, that the “tendency to cooperate is greater 
when subjects anticipate prolonged interaction with others as members of a group”); GARY 
CHARNESS ET AL., SOCIAL DISTANCE AND RECIPROCITY: THE INTERNET VS. THE LABORATORY 
1-4, 23 (Sept. 13, 2001) (Working Paper Series, available on Social Science Research 
Network), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID312141_code020515560.pdf? 
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are beginning to recognize that these studies could have important 
implications for tax policy,8 but the hard work remains of translating 
the insights of these analyses into the context of a coercive tax 
system.  
In Part III, we introduce some additional difficulties present in 
real-world taxpaying situations. Some of these difficulties relate to 
the contested ends of taxation, including intentional redistribution, 
while others relate to the structure of the tax system. In Part IV, we 
turn to the anthropological and sociological literature for a richer and 
deeper understanding of the notion of reciprocity. Such an 
understanding helps us see whether and how to address the sources of 
tax aversion within a real-world taxation system. Some of the 
interactive features that mediate concerns about free riding and that 
sustain cooperation in cohesive small-group settings are necessarily 
absent in the federal taxation context. Yet, it still may be possible to 
make use of certain features conducive to cooperation, or 
approximations thereof, in the federal taxation context.  
In Part V, we discuss some possible ways of testing, refining, and 
applying empirical insights relating to tax aversion in the federal 
taxation context. Two features present in many real-world reciprocal 
contexts are the transparency of reciprocal moves and the ability of 
parties to communicate their preferences through the granting or 
withholding of contributions. We sketch a change in the interface 
encountered by the taxpayer that attempts to incorporate these 
features without otherwise effecting a substantive change in tax law. 
We propose this idea as a possible experimental design model to 
advance innovation in tax design and lay the groundwork for further 
experimentation in, and dialogue about, tax design.  
 
abstracted =312141; ARMIN FALK ET AL., INFORMAL SANCTIONS 31-32 (U. of Zurich, Inst. for 
Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 59, 2000), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID245568_code001011130.pdf?abstractid=245568 (testing for reciprocal 
behavior in Internet and classroom laboratory experiments and concluding that reciprocity 
decreases with increased social distance but is not eliminated). 
 8. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 4, at 340-44 (noting relevance of public goods 
experiments for tax-enforcement policy). 
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I. MAPPING TAX AVERSION 
It borders on the insipid to observe that most people dislike paying 
taxes. Perhaps for this reason, virtually no systematic work has been 
undertaken to gauge whether taxes are more aversive than other sorts 
of costs or losses. To be sure, a great deal of study has focused on 
questions of tax compliance.9 Additional studies have examined how 
taxpaying might be made to feel fairer or less burdensome to 
taxpayers.10 Notably, scholars have observed that reactions to survey 
questions about taxation are mutable and depend on the framing of 
the question11—a fact that problematizes the study of taxpayer 
attitudes, even as it provides clues to the nature and tractability of tax 
aversion. While this body of existing research concerning compliance 
burdens and perceptions of equity touches on and implicates 
instances of tax aversion, we think the phenomenon of aversion 
warrants a more direct exploration.  
A functional definition of the kind of tax aversion we wish to 
investigate is the amount by which one’s aversion to a tax exceeds 
the economic cost of the tax. A symptom of this kind of tax aversion 
would be a willingness to expend more on tax avoidance (or risk 
more through tax evasion)12 than is warranted by the economic cost 
 
 9. E.g., ALAN LEWIS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TAXATION 123-87 (1982); TAX EVASION: 
AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH (Paul Webley et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter TAX EVASION]; 
WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992); 
Carroll, supra note 4; John T. Scholz & Neil Pinney, Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The 
Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 490 (1995).  
 10. E.g., Gregory A. Carnes & Andrew D. Cuccia, An Analysis of the Effect of Tax 
Complexity and Its Perceived Justification on Equity Judgments, 18 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 40 
(1996); RONALD G. CUMMINGS ET AL., CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISONS OF TAX COMPLIANCE 
BEHAVIOR (Ga. State Univ., Int’l Studies Program Series, Working Paper No. 01-3, 2001), 
available at http://isp-aysps.gsu.edu/papers/ispwp0103.pdf; Thomas M. Porcano & Charles E. 
Price, Some Evidence on the Association Between Judgment Criteria and Fairness Perceptions, 
4 ADVANCES IN TAX’N 183 (1992); Martha L. Wartick, Legislative Justification and the 
Perceived Fairness of Tax Law Changes: A Referent Cognitions Theory Approach, 16 J. AM. 
TAX’N ASS’N 106 (1994). 
 11. E.g., LEWIS, supra note 9, at 47-49 & tbl.4.2 (discussing notorious malleability of 
survey responses and presenting table entitled “How to Record the Fiscal Preferences You 
Want from Attitude Surveys and Public Opinion Polls”). 
 12. TAX EVASION, supra note 9, at 2 (distinguishing tax avoidance, which involves legal 
efforts to reduce tax liability, from tax evasion, which involves illegal efforts to reduce taxes). 
For additional studies of issues in tax avoidance and evasion, see, for example, BRUNO S. FREY 
& LARS P. FELD, DETERRENCE AND MORALE IN TAXATION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (Ctr. for 
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of the tax. A substantial body of experimental literature indicates that 
people are willing to incur positive costs to keep others from getting 
away with conduct they perceive as unfair,13 and we believe that a 
similar dynamic might operate to heighten avoidance and evasion in 
the tax context.  
An example will illustrate the point. Imagine that Borg can reduce 
his tax bill either legally (by consuming tax deductible items) or 
illegally (by fabricating deductions).14 He can also simply pay the 
tax. In making the decision about avoidance, he should compare the 
tax-discounted price of the deductible item in question with the utility 
it generates for him. For example, if he is in a 36% marginal tax 
bracket and contemplates attending a conference that costs $1000 in 
real dollars (and if we further assume that his tax situation allows the 
full deduction of this amount), he should rationally attend the 
conference only if attending is worth more than $640 to him.15 If he 
subjectively values attending the conference at just $600, but attends 
because he wants to take the tax deduction, this suggests either 
irrationality, innumeracy, or an additional factor that makes taxes 
more painful than the dollar figure suggests (or, alternatively, that 
makes a tax savings of $360 more attractive to him than that dollar 
figure indicates). We call that additional factor “tax aversion.”  
Do people actually take tax deductions beyond the economically 
justified point or otherwise engage in nonoptimizing behavior with 
regard to tax avoidance? Some have intuited that this indeed occurs, 
and anecdotal evidence supports the proposition.16 For example, 
 
Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 706, 2002), 
http://papers.ssrn.ocm/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID341380_code021021590.pdf?abstractid=341
380; J. Slemrod & S. Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion and Administration, in 3 HANDBOOK 
OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1423-70 (A.J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein eds., 2002); J. Andreoni et al., 
Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 818 (1998).  
 13. See infra notes 37-47 and accompanying text (discussing studies involving dictator, 
ultimatum, and power-to-take games). 
 14. See supra notes 9, 12 (citing studies of compliance, evasion and avoidance). 
 15. We use the thirty-six percent marginal tax rate here for illustrative purposes only; 
actual marginal tax rates have been changing as a result of recent legislation. See I.R.C. § 1(i). 
Other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code address the availability of deductions. See, e.g., 
I.R.C. § 67(a) (establishing a floor for certain itemized deductions); I.R.C. § 68 (setting limits 
on allowable itemized deductions for taxpayers above a certain income). For purposes of this 
simple illustration, we ignore the complications associated with those limits. 
 16. E.g., McCaffery, supra note 1, at 1914-15 (suggesting people may consume 
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Texas has an annual “sales tax holiday”—a few days each August 
during which shoppers may purchase selected items free of sales tax. 
News articles covering the event note the huge crowds that descend 
upon stores to take advantage of this opportunity and the fact that 
some individuals make rather extraordinary expenditures in 
connection with it.17 The savings are not large, with a sales tax of 
8.25% in cities such as Austin, and some commentators quite 
reasonably speculate that merchants do not offer prices as low as they 
might in the absence of the tax break. However, monetary savings 
may not be the only factor motivating the behavior. As one shopper 
articulated, “there’s something to be said for finally beating the 
government at something.”18  
However, we know of no empirical study of such manifestations 
of tax aversion.19 Designing such a study would not be easy. For 
example, consider the difficulties that would be involved in 
attempting to measure whether an effective price change resulting 
from a change in tax treatment had a larger or smaller impact on 
consumer demand than a similar price change resulting from market 
 
deductible items beyond the point of optimality); id. at 1915 (making a similar point regarding 
the use of unprofitable tax shelters). 
 17. Rod Kurtz, A Buyers’ Bonanza, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN at A1, A10 (Aug. 3, 
2002) (describing expenditures such as staying in hotels in order to be closer to the stores when 
they open). 
 18. Id. at A10 (quoting Pamela Krisan, a shopper taking advantage of the Texas “tax 
holiday”). Of course, one might argue that attitudes towards taxation in Texas, a state that has 
long resisted enacting an income tax, do not necessarily typify those that prevail nationwide. 
However, organized events such as sales tax holidays and time-limited amnesty offers for 
taxpayers incorporate the characteristics of “inversion” or “reversal” rituals that anthropologists 
have found to be a frequent component of secular rituals within stratified societies. Such 
inversion rituals serve to relax normal societal and legal rules within a bounded context and 
time period. By relaxing, or reversing, the existing legal rules within such limited frameworks, 
sales tax holidays and amnesties can serve to reinforce and emphasize the applicability and 
enforceability of those rules at all other times. VICTOR TURNER, THE RITUAL PROCESS 172-78 
(1995); Evon Z. Vogt, Rituals of Reversal as a Means of Rewiring Social Structure, in THE 
REALM OF THE EXTRA-HUMAN: IDEAS AND ACTION 201-11 (Agehananda Bharati ed., 1976); 
see also Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy and How 
We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 219 (1996) (finding tax amnesty effective 
when “taxpayers perceive that the amnesty will be followed immediately by substantially 
increased enforcement of the law”).  
 19. In a 1994 article, Edward McCaffery noted this lack of empirical work on the question 
of excessive avoidance behaviors: “I am aware of no study that pins this particular phenomenon 
down. Thus, this discussion remains anecdotal for now.” McCaffery, supra note 1, at 1915.  
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forces.20 The unavailability of existing data suitable for these 
purposes and the difficulty in formulating a method for successfully 
collecting such data outside of a controlled laboratory experiment 
present daunting challenges. Nevertheless, beginning to imagine what 
such a study might look like can help set the stage for innovative 
research in this area. 
Another possible manifestation of tax aversion might be increased 
evasion. Recall that Borg has the ability to fabricate deductions rather 
than actually consume deductible items. In deciding whether or not to 
fabricate deductions, many factors could play a role, but on a strict 
economic analysis we imagine that Borg will compare the expected 
cost of fabricating the deduction (a product of the probability of 
detection multiplied by the costs of defending himself and paying 
penalties for this sort of tax evasion) with the expected tax benefit to 
be derived from the fabrication.21 If Borg fabricates a deduction for 
$1,000, it yields him $360 in tax benefits. To be “worth it” for Borg 
to break the law, the expected value of punishment for violating the 
law must be less than $360. If Borg runs a one percent chance of 
being caught and expects to suffer defense and punishment costs of 
$40,000 if caught, the expected value of such costs equals $400.22 
 
 20.  For an overview of some of the methodological considerations and complications 
associated with the design of empirical studies, see E. Allan Lind, John E. Shapard, & Joe 
Shelby Cecil, Appendix B: Methods for Empirical Evaluation of Innovations in the Justice 
System, in EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW: REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW 81, 88-112 (1981). 
 21.  See ROSEN, supra note 2, at 326-27 (presenting a more detailed account of an 
individual’s tax evasion calculation). 
 22. This hypothetical probability of detection exceeds actual audit rates in recent years. 
For taxpayers with less than $100,000 in annual income, the probability of being subjected to a 
federal income tax audit was 1.60% in fiscal year 1995, 1.58% in 1996, 1.19% in 1997, 0.92% 
in 1998, 0.86% in 1999, 0.45% in 2000, and 0.55% in 2001. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
PROGRESS REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 43 (Dec. 2001), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/pub3970_2-2002.pdf. The audit rates in these years 
for taxpayers with annual incomes of $100,000 or more were 2.97% in 1995, 3.21% in 1996, 
2.74% in 1997, 2.01% in 1998, 1.40% in 1999, 0.96% in 2000, and 0.79% in 2001. Id. 
Moreover, the penalty amount we have posited far exceeds the monetary penalties actually 
imposed. The actual penalty levels under current law call for payment of the tax due, accrued 
interest on that amount, plus a penalty of twenty percent of that tax amount if underpayment 
resulted from negligence or substantial understatement of taxes due. I.R.C. § 6662. The penalty 
level increases to seventy-five percent of the tax amount due if the taxpayer underpaid as a 
result of fraudulent conduct. Id. § 6663(a). Our hypothetical assumes that Borg would incur 
substantial additional costs in defending himself against an audit and subsequent legal 
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Because this cost exceeds the monetary savings associated with the 
fabricated deduction, we do not expect a rational Borg to fabricate. 
However, if we posit that another factor makes the fabricated 
deduction worth more than what the dollar value suggests, the 
calculation might change. 
How might we measure whether people are actually adding in an 
additional “kicker” associated with tax aversion in making evasion 
decisions? It might seem that they are doing exactly the opposite. 
Relatively few people evade taxes, even though we might expect the 
combination of low audit rates and low penalties to make evasion 
attractive from the standpoint of rational calculation.23 Yet people 
likely overestimate the probability and severity of punishment, and 
also give unknown amounts of weight to intangible factors such as 
guilt and shame in their decisionmaking.24 Because tax evasion is 
notoriously difficult to detect and to distinguish from unintentional 
taxpayer errors,25 it is hard to gain much insight into subjective 
taxpayer calculations based on detected instances of evasion. A 
number of controlled laboratory experiments have attempted to 
measure and evaluate tax evasion.26 However, evasion in these 
contrived settings arguably does not compare with real-world 
evasion.27 It is impossible to accurately estimate the perceived 
 
proceedings, and would also suffer significant intangible disutility associated with detection and 
punishment.  
 23.  Overall compliance rates in recent years have exceeded eighty-three percent. 
CUMMINGS ET AL., supra note 10, at 3 n.3. 
 24. Id. at 3-4; see ROSEN, supra note 2, at 328 (noting the “psychic costs of cheating”).  
 25. LEWIS, supra note 9, at 124-26; Paul Webley et al., The Problem of Measurement, in 
TAX EVASION, supra note 9, at 29, 30-35; Carroll, supra note 4, at 509.  
 26. See supra notes 9, 12 (citing studies on evasion and compliance enforcement efforts). 
 27. For example, participants may view the experimental interface as a game and may not 
view decisions about evasion with the same moral seriousness (or with the same fear of 
humiliation and punishment) as they might in the real world. Paul Webley et al., The Subjects’ 
View, in TAX EVASION, supra note 9, at 114; Paul Webley & S. Halstead, Tax Evasion on the 
Micro: Significant Simulations or Expedient Experiments?, 1 J. INTERDISC. ECON. 87 (1986); 
see also Susan Long & Judyth Swingen, The Conduct of Tax-Evasion Experiments: Validation, 
Analytical Methods, and Experimental Realism, in TAX EVASION, supra note 9, at 128, 136-37 
(observing that tax evasion experiments do not involve the threat of non-financial punishments 
such as imprisonment). On the other hand, some participants may shun evasion behaviors in the 
experimental setting out of a desire to appear “honest” to the experimenter or otherwise provide 
responses they believe the researchers desire. See, e.g., Webley et al., The Subjects’ View, 
supra, at 114, 117. 
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severity of punishment that confronts taxpayers (which includes 
individual subjective valuations of being imprisoned or fined, as well 
as any dollar amounts paid in penalties or defense costs) or 
taxpayers’ perceptions of the probability that a given fabrication will 
be detected.28 A qualitative study that attempts to tap into the 
calculations made by tax evaders would provide invaluable help in 
this regard.  
Heightened avoidance and evasion do not adequately capture all 
of the costs associated with tax aversion. Some taxpayers have little 
ability to avoid or evade taxes or may reach limits in their ability to 
take advantage of these tactics. For others, even inflated measures of 
benefits derived from avoiding or evading taxes provide insufficient 
triggers for avoidance or evasion because the costs still loom higher. 
Hence, Borg might neither evade nor avoid, but instead simply suffer 
the disutility associated with tax aversion. We might also wish, then, 
to measure the increased disutility that accompanies tax aversion, 
even when not manifested in changed avoidance or evasion 
behavior.29  
The theoretical question is easy enough to state: whether taxes are 
more painful than other economically equivalent events. An 
economically equivalent event would be a gain or a loss through 
some means other than taxation that has an equal dollar value to the 
gain or loss associated with the tax payment and the corresponding 
benefits received. However, a difficulty arises when we attempt to 
pin down whether a given taxpayer has enjoyed a gain or suffered a 
loss as a result of a tax payment. If we show a rational individual a 
world in which no tax-financed goods exist (including no 
government, no courts, no police, no national defense, no schools, no 
roads, and so on) and ask her how much she would pay to move from 
 
 28.  Taxpayers may also make different calculations regarding evasion depending on 
whether they view themselves as facing a loss (taxes due at year’s end) or a gain (refund 
already forthcoming). For a recent review of the literature on this point, see Chris Guthrie, 
Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 Nw. U.L. REV. 1115, 1142-45 (2003). 
 29. It is also possible that tax aversion not immediately manifested behaviorally due to 
lack of opportunity might translate into behavioral manifestations at a later time when 
opportunities become available to the individual taxpayer. Another theoretical possibility, 
unexplored to our knowledge, is whether frustrated tax aversion might be redirected into 
noncompliant behavior in other interactions with the government, such as benefit claims.  
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol13/iss1/4
p 75 Fennell.doc  9/22/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003]  Fear and Greed in Tax Policy 85 
 
this chaotic world to one in which our current slate of tax-financed 
goods exists, the answer would surely exceed the amount that the 
individual pays in taxes.30 However, it does not follow that individual 
taxpayers would not choose, at the margin, to pay lower taxes and 
receive fewer services, provided they could pick and choose which 
services to continue receiving and which ones to jettison.  
A potentially more useful approach brackets the theoretical 
question by identifying the economic events that occupy the extreme 
ends of a spectrum of financial transactions: market exchanges and 
uncompensated losses. On the one hand, we expect that a tax would 
generate more aversion than would a market transaction. Unlike a 
market transaction, a taxpayer does not choose her owed payment 
(except in the limited sense suggested by opportunities for evasion or 
avoidance), and a tax payment does not yield an immediate, tangible 
object of exchange. On the other hand, a tax is not quite the same as a 
theft or other uncompensated loss; it does go somewhere and yields 
at least some benefits (ambient or otherwise)31 for the taxpayer. It 
seems that a tax occupies a middle ground between loss and 
exchange—an intermediate status further complicated both by the 
possibility of free riding and the lack of any rhetorical connection (at 
least with respect to the federal income tax) between payments made 
and benefits received.  
Do people perceive taxes more like losses, exchanges, or some 
third mental category of expenses, such as bad gambles or mandated 
purchases? Or do they attempt to mentally disaggregate the portion of 
their taxes that corresponds to identifiable benefits from the extra 
amount they must pay to “carry” or cross-subsidize full or partial free 
 
 30. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 16 (2002) (arguing 
that “the baseline for determining the benefits of government is the welfare a person would 
enjoy if government were entirely absent; the benefit of government services must be 
understood as the difference between someone’s level of welfare in a no-government world and 
their welfare with government in place”); cf. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 210 (1985) 
(observing that “a court could place all legislative initiatives past and future in a single hopper 
and proclaim that the benefits and burdens are always proportionate, thereby gutting the takings 
clause for general regulation”). 
 31. Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit and Voice: User Participation in the Production of 
Local Public Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001) (differentiating between the consumption 
good of public education or safety and the composite good that results from the community-
wide pattern of consumption of these goods).  
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riders, so that they perceive the tax as a bundle containing some 
exchange value and some loss?32 If so, does the fact that free riding 
occurs make the loss greater than the number of dollars involved 
indicates? Does the fact that one is interacting with the government 
change the situation? Does the compulsory nature of the collection 
add to the disutility? Surprisingly, few studies address this set of 
questions in the tax context. 
One possible line of qualitative research into these questions could 
use survey questions and interviews to probe the relative degree of 
disutility associated with a variety of ambiguous expenditures of a 
particular sum of money, all of which straddle the middle ground 
between loss and exchange. Such data could help identify the features 
that contribute to tax aversion and provide a richer understanding of 
how people perceive taxes. While a full experimental design protocol 
is beyond the scope of this paper, we suggest starting with something 
like the survey questions listed in Figure 1. 
 
 32. As discussed below, identifying when and whether one is actually subsidizing or 
carrying free riders (as opposed to simply purchasing a redistributive public good with ambient 
benefits or purchasing social insurance against potential risks) proves to be a difficult and 
controversial task.  
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Figure 1 
  
Indicate on a scale of 1 to 4 how much you would be bothered by each of 
the following scenarios, assuming (where relevant) that there would be no 
way to rectify the problem:  (1 = not bothered at all; 2 = slightly bothered; 3 = 
significantly bothered;  4 = extremely upset). 
 
On the back of the sheet, please add any explanations or qualifications. 
 
1. suffering a $100 gambling loss at a local casino 
2. missing by one day a sale that discounts a major appliance by $100 
3. accidentally dropping a $100 bill into a storm drain 
4. buying a $100 used computer “as is” and finding that it does not 
work 
5. receiving a $100 speeding ticket for going 26 mph in a 20 mph zone 
6. contributing $100, as agreed, to a workplace fund for a terminally ill 
  colleague and later learning that most people contributed less than 
$20 and several people contributed nothing at all 
7. learning that, as a result of a new law, you owe an extra $100 in tax 
to the federal government 
8. learning that you paid $100 more than necessary for an original 
work by a local artist 
9. paying $100 in dues for a club membership to help pay for club 
activities and facilities, where club members who cannot afford the 
dues are relieved of the dues requirement or are given subsidized 
rates 
10. being required by law to purchase a motorcycle helmet (the cheapest 
one costs $100) in order to cycle on public streets  
 There are some obvious limitations to this approach. One 
significant problem is that the brief scenarios in the survey items 
listed in Figure 1 provide only the thinnest of contextual cues. 
Research indicates that the surrounding context or “frame” can be 
extremely important in processing or “coding” an event.33 For 
example, a respondent’s reaction to item number one might depend 
on how she mentally constructs the context of the imagined gambling 
loss—whether she imagines it as a loss occurring in isolation or as 
 
 33. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice, in FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO THE LAW 304 
(Avery Wiener Katz ed., 1998); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 274 (1979); Anton Kühberger, The 
Influence of Framing on Risky Decisions: A Meta-Analysis, 75 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & 
HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 23, 24-25 (1998).  
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 75 Fennell.doc  9/22/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 13:75 
 
one following earlier wins or losses.34 We could make similar points 
about many of the other items. Therefore it becomes difficult to 
determine whether differential responses to the various scenarios 
were merely reactions to different contextual assumptions or mental 
frames, rather than to perceived differences in substantive features of 
the posited situation.  
Another problem arises when different respondents have different 
preferences about the specific substantive matters raised in the 
scenarios. Attitudes and past experiences related to gambling, to 
motorcycles, to the arts, to terminal illnesses, or to speeding tickets 
can lead to differential responses that do not necessarily represent 
true reactions to the features intentionally planted by the researcher.  
For both of these reasons, making sense out of responses requires 
the collection of more substantial data in the form of written 
comments and follow-up interviews.35 Some studies of taxpaying 
have attempted to qualitatively evaluate respondents’ reactions to 
different tax environments.36 It would be very useful to extend that 
body of qualitative work to encompass other kinds of interactions that 
might implicate some of the more troubling aspects of taxpaying. 
An alternative way of exploring the phenomenon of tax aversion 
consists of examining empirical work in related contexts to isolate 
some of the structural and contextual features that might drive or 
mitigate tax aversion. Empirical studies indicating that people will 
incur positive costs to punish those whom they perceive as acting 
unfairly might provide a template for understanding tax aversion, 
particularly as manifested in expenditures on tax avoidance that 
 
 34. See, e.g., Richard Thaler & Eric Johnson, Gambling with the House Money and Trying 
to Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice, 36 MGMT. SCI. 643, 657 (1990) 
(discussing the “house money” effect, in which gamblers exhibit a greater tendency to take risks 
with prior gambling winnings, presumably because gamblers can mentally “code” the later 
losses in a manner that integrates them with the prior gains); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 
33, at 310-11. 
 35. H. RUSSELL BERNARD, RESEARCH METHODS IN ANTHROPOLOGY: QUALITATIVE AND 
QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES 256-88 (1995); FLOYD J. FOWLER, JR., SURVEY RESEARCH 
METHODS 99-123 (1984). 
 36. E.g., Donna Bobek & Richard C. Hatfield, The Effect of Policy Objectives, 
Complexity, and Self-Interest on Individuals’ Comparative Fairness Judgments of a Flat Tax, 
13 ADVANCES IN TAX’N 1 (2001); Carnes & Cuccia, supra note 10; Valerie C. Milliron et al., 
Policy Judgments of Taxpayers: An Analysis of Criteria Employed, 2 ADVANCES IN TAX’N 201 
(1989).  
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exceed the financial cost of the tax.37 In the experimental “ultimatum 
game,” for example, one player proposes a division of a sum of 
money to a second player, who may either accept or reject the 
division.38 If the second player rejects the proposal, both players 
receive nothing; if the second player accepts the proposal, the parties 
both receive the proposed division amounts.39 Numerous studies 
show that the responding players “typically reject offers of less than 
20 percent of the total amount available,” establishing that players are 
“willing to punish unfair behavior, even at a financial cost to 
themselves.”40  
We can find even closer parallels to taxpayer behavior in studies 
involving the “power-to-take” game.41 Before the game begins, each 
participant earns income by performing a task on a computer.42 
Experimenters then randomly assign participants to one of two roles, 
a “take authority” or a “responder,” and randomly pair them up with 
 
 37. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of 
Reciprocity, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2000, at 159, 161-62 (describing and collecting cites to 
studies of the ultimatum game in a number of countries); see also Joseph Henrich et al., In 
Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in Fifteen Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. 
ECON. REV. 73 (2001) (describing the same); Alvin E. Roth et al., Bargaining and Market 
Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study, 81 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1068 (1991) (describing the same).  
 38. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 21-23 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). Similarly, the proposers in 
ultimatum games frequently make initial allocations that reflect concerns for fair-dealing, rather 
than self-interested maximization of their own shares. Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Behavioral 
Foundations of Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Evolutionary Psychology, 36 ECON. 
INQUIRY 335, 340-44 (1998) (discussing various ultimatum game experiments that show initial 
allocation offers frequently range between twenty percent and fifty percent). Unlike ultimatum 
games, a subject in a “dictator game” is assigned the role of proposer and is not confronted with 
a recipient who can decide whether to accept or reject the proposed allocation. The frequency of 
initial allocation offers reflecting self-interested maximization on the part of the proposer 
increases in such games over that seen in ultimatum games. However, offered allocations 
showing concerns for fair-dealing and reciprocity are not entirely eliminated, even when the 
proposer knows nothing about the putative recipient of the dictated allocation. E.g., Elizabeth 
Hoffman et al., Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games, 86 AM. 
ECON. REV. 653 (1996).  
 39. Jolls et al., supra note 38, at 21-22.  
 40. Id. at 22. 
 41. See Bosman & van Winden, supra note 1, at 147-49 (describing the power-to-take 
game, and the potential of the game to model taxation issues). 
 42. Id. at 148; see id. at 151 & n.8 (describing the computer task, which took thirty 
minutes, and subjects’ perceptions of the task as “work”). 
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each other.43 The player designated as the take authority chooses a 
“take rate,” which is the proportion of the responder’s income she 
wishes to appropriate.44 The responder can choose to destroy all or 
any part of her own income before having the take rate applied to it.45 
Destroying income involves real costs for the responder, but it also 
reduces the amount that the take authority receives.46 Therefore, the 
game offers an ideal vehicle for investigating “how subjects trade off 
emotional satisfaction of punishment against monetary gain,”47 an 
investigation that could shed much light on the dynamics of tax 
aversion.  
Also of potential relevance is the growing body of empirical work 
using experimental games to model the provision of public goods.48 
These experiments attempt to identify the conditions that lead people 
to voluntarily contribute to public goods, and, conversely, the 
conditions that make it more likely that people will fail to contribute. 
A study of the success or failure of collective action in uncoerced 
settings might lead to an understanding about the degree to which the 
legal mechanism of compulsory collection coordinates and facilitates 
the kinds of cooperative endeavors in which people would voluntarily 
engage absent coercion, and the degree to which compulsory 
 
 43.  Id. at 151. 
 44.  Id. at 148. 
 45.  Id. Unlike the binary choice presented by the ultimatum game, the power-to-take 
game permits the responder to choose exactly how much (if any) of her own income to destroy. 
Id. at 148 n.2. Interestingly, however, most responders in the Bosman and van Winden study 
chose one of two extreme reactions, either destroying all of their income or none of it. See id. at 
153-54 & tbl.1 (discussing this finding). For example, half of the eight responders presented 
with take rates of seventy-five percent or higher opted for total destruction, and one additional 
respondent chose ninety-nine percent destruction; the other three responders engaged in no 
destruction at all. Id. at 153 tbl.1. No destruction of income occurred in this experiment at take 
rates of less than seventy percent. Id.  
 46. Id. at 148.  
 47. Id. Responders’ self-reports suggest the presence of negative emotions, including 
“irritation, contempt, anger, and envy,” both among those who destroyed income and those who 
did not. Id. at 153. However, the strength of these negative emotions varied positively with the 
take rate, and the intensity of negative emotions and the take rate were both positively 
correlated with the destruction of income. Id. at 154-56 & tbls. 2, 3, 4. 
 48. For a concise and useful introduction to the literature on public goods experiments, 
see Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 
1998, at 187; see also Christina M. Fong et al., Behavioral Foundations of Egalitarianism, 
Reciprocity and Altruism 9-11 (Aug. 8, 2002), available at http://www.umass.edu/preferen/ 
gintis/bfghand.pdf (discussing experimental literature on n-player public goods games). 
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collection instead forces contributions that would not otherwise be 
made.49 The larger the latter component, the larger the degree of tax 
aversion we would expect to see.50  
II. LEARNING FROM PUBLIC GOODS GAMES 
A large body of experimental work conducted in controlled 
laboratory settings analyzes how people react to small-group games 
involving contributions to a public good.51 Contrary to predictions 
that might flow from a simple rational actor model of human 
behavior, significant levels of voluntary contributions have been 
found in numerous public goods games and other experimental 
interactions conducted in various times and places.52 We believe that 
 
 49. An analogous contrast might be drawn between two traffic laws—one that dictates the 
side of the road on which people should drive, and another that limits speed on a wide, straight, 
uncongested thoroughfare to 40 miles per hour. The first law coordinates the sort of cooperative 
action in which people would engage anyway, while the second law most likely coerces 
behavior in which people would not otherwise engage.  
 50. It is not quite as simple as that, however, because compulsion fundamentally changes 
the picture. On the one hand, some people who are willing to contribute voluntarily under a 
given set of circumstances may resent a compulsory collection under the same set of 
circumstances if part of what made the contribution attractive in the first case was its voluntary 
nature. Cf. Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 274, 
298-99 (1966) (presenting experimental results indicating that appeals to subjects’ consciences 
are more successful in increasing tax compliance than increased threats of sanctions). On the 
other hand, adding elements of compulsion directed at thwarting free riders can elicit higher 
levels of voluntary contributions. In the latter case, the compulsion might be seen as a proxy for 
a social contract or other voluntary arrangement in which the group’s members derive benefits 
from binding themselves to undertake certain obligations. See John T. Scholz, Carrots or Just 
Deserts: Adding Assurance to Deterrence Models 7-10 (2002) (on file with author) (discussing 
a contractual model of tax collection). There are also many differences between the 
experimental setting and the real-world tax context that complicate matters; for an exploration 
of these complications, see Part III, infra. 
 51.  A pure public good, in the economic sense, exhibits two features: non-rival 
consumption and non-excludable consumption. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 2, at 56 (setting 
forth these criteria). Few or no real-world goods fit this definition in the strict sense, but many 
goods do exhibit these features to some degree, or over some range. See, e.g., RUSSELL 
HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 19 (1982) (observing that “one can easily list goods that seem 
similar to public goods over some range of the number of consumers”). The goods that are at 
issue in the experiments we describe might instead be termed collective goods or group goods. 
See id. (expressing a preference for this terminology when a good does not fit the criteria of a 
pure public good). However, because the term “public goods” is typically used in the 
experiments themselves, we will retain that terminology here. 
 52. For example, Fehr and Gächter, supra note 37, summarize a variety of laboratory and 
survey studies showing that individual participants from contemporary, Western societies 
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the conditions eliciting voluntary contributions might be the same as 
the conditions in which compulsory tax collection becomes more 
acceptable. Similarly, the circumstances in which people resist 
making voluntary contributions to public goods are the same 
circumstances in which compulsory collections would be resented.  
One common experimental game is set up so that contributions to 
the group are multiplied by some factor and then redistributed to the 
group’s members in equal shares.53 For example, a group of seven 
people might each begin with $5.00, which the members may either 
keep or contribute to the group; contributions are then multiplied by a 
factor of three and redistributed to the group on a per capita basis. If 
group members cannot make binding agreements with other 
members, a single player will always do best by not contributing, 
regardless of what everyone else does. If a representative player, Aja, 
does not contribute but everyone else in the group does, then Aja’s 
payoff equals her $5.00 “non-contribution” plus her share of the pot 
($12.86),54 for a total of $17.86. If Aja contributes along with the rest 
of the group, she receives only $15, one-seventh of a somewhat large 
pot ($105).55 On the other hand, if nobody contributes, including Aja, 
she keeps her $5.00, and if only Aja contributes, she receives only 
1/7 of the $15.00 pot, or $2.14. At all points in between these 
extreme cases, the same logic holds true; Aja always does best by not 
contributing, no matter what the other players do.  
This “multiplier” public goods game represents a garden-variety 
multi-party prisoner’s dilemma.56 Figure 2 illustrates the basic payoff 
 
(ranging from forty to sixty-six percent of the subjects) often employed principles of reciprocity 
in posited exchanges, while a smaller percentage (twenty to thirty percent of the subjects) 
employed measures of self-interest. Id. at 162; see Hoffman et al., Behavioral Foundations of 
Reciprocity, supra note 38, at 340-41 (discussing typical outcomes in ultimatum and dictator 
games); Roth et al., supra note 37, at 1091-94 (discussing similar outcomes in bargaining 
games in cross-cultural settings).  
 53. See, e.g., Dawes & Thaler, supra note 48, at 188 (describing the typical public good 
game with multiplier).  
 54. This figure results from first multiplying the $5 contributions of the other 6 players by 
the multiplier factor of 3, which yields a pot of $90. We then equally divide that pot among the 
7 players ($90/7 = $12.86). 
 55. 7 X $5.00 X 3 = $105 
 56. See Amnon Rapoport, Provision of Public Goods and the MCS Experimental 
Paradigm, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 148, 148-49 (1985) (observing that “[i]f the benefit to the 
group increases as the number of contributors grows, with no minimal contributing set (MCS), 
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structure; the payoff line for “contribute” always lies below the 
payoff line for “don’t contribute.”57 The dotted horizontal line 
represents the starting sum each player receives ($5.00 in the 
example above).  
Figure 2 
Payoffs for One Player in a “Multiplier” 
Public Good Contribution Game 
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Not all public goods games involve a multiplying pot of money 
where each contribution yields the same marginal benefit to the 
group. Other public goods experiments provide a single lump-sum 
bonus to the group if enough group members contribute.58 This 
represents a “step-level” good59 that is best conceptualized by 
the provision of public goods may be modeled as an n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game in 
which the (pure) strategy not to contribute is unconditionally best”); HARDIN, supra note 51, at 
25-28 (demonstrating that provision of a collective good presents a strategic dilemma that is 
logically identical to the Prisoner’s Dilemma); see also Russell Hardin, Collective Action as an 
Agreeable N-Prisoners’ Dilemma, 16 BEHAV. SCI. 472 (1971) (providing a more extensive 
analysis of the same point).  
 57. See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 27-28 & fig.1.3 (1989) (analyzing and 
depicting a structurally identical dilemma, using a graph type introduced by Thomas Schelling). 
 58.  See infra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing components and design of a step-
level public good game). 
 59. Step-level goods are public goods for which some minimum threshold of 
contributions must be obtained in order for the good to be provided at all, and additional 
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considering a real-world analogy: a bridge.60 A partial bridge is 
useless, and a bridge that spans more than the necessary space 
provides no additional benefits. Thus, contributions short of the 
threshold necessary to provide an entire bridge are of no use, and 
contributions in excess of that threshold are superfluous. Imagine that 
a bridge will cost $10,000 to construct, and that we have ten players 
who will all benefit equally from the bridge. Each player will receive 
a benefit of $2,000 if the bridge is built, making the project clearly 
worthwhile. Further imagine that a machine costlessly transforms 
players’ contributions into bridge construction. The players have no 
opportunity for communication or side-deals, and each player 
contributes confidentially, so no player can impose even informal 
sanctions on noncontributors.61  
Will the bridge be build? It might seem there is little reason for 
optimism. First, each player knows that if she contributes while 
enough others fail to do so, she will lose her money (the bridge-
building machine transforms the contribution into a useless partial 
bridge). In addition, each player knows that it would be “worth it” for 
the others to provide the bridge even without her participation, and 
this creates a powerful incentive to free ride. These two hindrances to 
cooperation can be labeled “fear” and “greed,” respectively.62 Each 
 
contributions made above that threshold do not increase or improve the good. See, e.g., Ido 
Erev & Amon Rapoport, Provision of Step-Level Public Goods: The Sequential Contribution 
Mechanism, 34 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 401, 403 (1990) (discussing “public or collective 
goods that only exist after a substantial amount has been contributed to their production, and 
then do not increase in quality or quantity if more contributions are made”). 
 60. Note that a bridge is not a pure public good in the economic sense. See supra note 51 
(defining public goods). While a bridge is nonrival within a certain range (until crowding 
inhibits the use of the bridge), the use of tolls can easily provide exclusivity. 
 61. See Robyn M. Dawes et al., Organizing Groups for Collective Action, 80 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 1171, 1175 (1986) (describing a “standard step-level public goods game” as “one that 
involves no communication, no opportunity for persuasion or coercion, no possibility of side 
payments or reciprocity, and no social disclosure of individual choices (except to the 
experimenters)”).  
 62. Id. at 1173-74 (citing Clyde Coombs, A Reparameterization of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game, 18 BEHAV. SCI. 424, 424-28 (1973), which discusses the competing motives of 
fear and greed in the context of a prisoner’s dilemma). The use of the term “fear” by Dawes and 
his coauthors to refer to a futile contribution constitutes only one of several possible uses of that 
term in the context of experimental games. It might also be used to refer to a fear of retaliation 
in a repeat-play game, as in Coombs, supra, at 426, or to the fear of being “suckered” by others. 
See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text (discussing varying uses of these terms).  
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individual faces three possible outcomes: her contribution will be 
futile (despite the contribution, there are insufficient funds to provide 
the bridge), critical (the contribution makes the difference in the 
completion of the bridge), or redundant (the bridge would have been 
built even without the contribution).63 Only in the case where the 
individual’s contribution is critical would a rational actor find 
contributing worthwhile.64  
If we simplify the choice situation to one in which our 
representative player, Aja, decides whether or not to contribute her 
“share” ($1,000) to the bridge project, the payoffs depicted in Table 1 
frame the choice: 
Table 1 
Net Payoffs in a Step-Level Public Goods Game 
 
 Futile Critical Redundant 
Contribute - $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 
Don’t 
Contribute 0 0 $2,000 
 
If Aja contributes futilely, she loses $1,000 with no countervailing 
benefits. If Aja contributes nothing where her contribution would 
have been futile, she receives a net payout of zero (she loses nothing, 
and gains nothing). If Aja makes a critical contribution, she receives 
a benefit of $2,000 at a cost of $1,000, yielding a net gain of $1,000. 
If she contributes nothing when her contribution would have been 
critical, she again pays nothing and receives nothing. Finally, if her 
contribution will be redundant, making it yields her a net payoff of 
$1000 ($2,000-$1,000); choosing not to contribute in this event 
produces benefits of $2,000 at zero cost. 
 
 63. See Dawes et al., supra note 61, at 1178 (applying this analysis to a step-level good); 
see also Rapoport, supra note 56, at 149-50 (presenting formal analysis corresponding to this 
framework, and discussing similar models applied to voting behavior). 
 64. See Dawes et al., supra note 61, at 1178.  
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Thus, we would expect Aja to contribute when she anticipates that 
her contribution will be critical, but not when she expects it to be 
either futile or redundant. A rational Aja would base her course of 
action on estimates of the respective probabilities of each of these 
three states of the world.65 Only when the probability that she will 
make a critical contribution exceeds fifty percent will Aja find it 
worthwhile to contribute her fair share, based on these monetary 
payoffs.66 Thus, voluntary contributions to step-level public goods 
are only rational when players determine that the chance of making a 
critical contribution is sufficiently high, and irrational otherwise.67  
Because the odds are vanishingly small that one’s own 
contribution will be “critical” in public finance settings, the step-good 
 
 65. For example, if Aja judges the three possibilities (futile, critical, and redundant) as 
equally likely, she will make a decision based on the expected values generated by those 
probabilities as follows: 
Contribute = (-$1,000 X .33) + ($1,000 X .33) + ($1,000 X .33) = $333 
Don’t Contribute = (0 X .33) + (0 X .33) + ($2,000 X .33) = $666 
Under these assumptions, the choice not to contribute dominates.  
 66. The following equations, which assume a 52% probability of a critical contribution 
and probabilities of 24% for each of the other two possibilities, illustrate: 
Contribute = (-$1,000 X .24) + ($1,000 X .52) + ($1,000 X .24) = $520 
Don’t Contribute = (0 X .24) + (0 X .52) + ($2,000 X .24) = $480 
Here, the “contribute” option dominates. See Dawes et al., supra note 61, at 1178 (noting that if 
the chance of a critical contribution exceeds 0.50, a participant will expect a net gain from 
contributing).  
 67. Robyn Dawes and his colleagues tested this hypothesis by asking subjects 
participating in a step-level public good experiment to estimate the respective chances that their 
contribution would be futile, critical, and redundant. Id. at 1178-79 (describing theoretical 
framework and methodology). The results were interesting, in part because the contribution 
level in the standard game accompanied by the probability estimates—a mere 23%—was 
significantly lower than in two experiments run a few years earlier by the authors. Compare id. 
at 1180 tbl.3 (showing contribution rates of 23% in the standard dilemma involving probability 
estimates) with id. at 1176-77 tbls.1-2 (presenting results of two previous standard public goods 
experiments with contribution levels of 51% and 64%, respectively). While the authors 
cautioned against “too easy” speculation about the causes of these differences, id. at 1180, we 
cannot resist one vein of speculation: Could making people estimate these probabilities cause 
them to approach the choice in a more calculating frame of mind, such that they become more 
“rationally uncooperative”? While the cooperators contributed despite an average subjective 
chance of making a critical contribution of 0.29 (far below the 0.50 mark above which 
contributions become rational), the many defectors, on average, judged the chance of a critical 
contribution to be even less likely (0.18). Id. at 1180-81 & tbl. 4. 
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analysis might seem to have little traction for tax policy.68 Yet more 
than the rationality calculation suggested here underlies contribution 
decisions. Contributions occur at significant levels even where the 
public good involved is not of the “step” variety (that is, where the 
“don’t contribute” option should always dominate), and also occur 
with step-level goods even where subjective estimates of the chance 
of making a critical contribution are too low to rationally justify 
making the contribution.69 Experiments involving step-level goods 
help in pinpointing motivations, and thus help us discover the 
additional factors potentially involved in contribution decisions for 
public goods of all sorts.  
Dawes and his co-authors used a step-level game to determine the 
relative importance of fear (of losing one’s contribution to a public 
good without receiving the public good) and greed (the opportunity to 
free ride) in jeopardizing the provision of public goods.70 After 
conducting a standard public goods game to establish a baseline for 
cooperation,71 the Dawes study controls for fear of a futile 
contribution by offering a money-back guarantee.72 To put this in 
terms of our bridge-building machine, rather than construct a partial 
bridge with the contributions, the machine detects the insufficiency of 
funds and returns all contributions to the contributors. Next, Dawes 
and his co-authors attempted to control for greed by adding an 
“enforced contribution” requirement, providing that if players raise 
 
 68. In contrast, in small-group settings each group member can verbally pre-commit to 
providing no more than her fair share, dramatically increasing the odds that each individual will 
perceive her own contribution to be critical to the enterprise.  
 69. See supra notes 52, 66-67 and accompanying text. 
 70. The authors presented the results of three different experiments, each with three parts: 
a standard public goods game, a game involving a “money-back” guarantee, and a game 
involving an “enforced contribution” condition. See Dawes et al., supra note 61, at 1176-79. 
The third experiment also involved subjects’ subjective estimates of the probability that their 
contribution would be futile, critical, or redundant. Id. at 1178-79; see supra note 67 and 
accompanying text (discussing this experiment). 
 71. The game involved the provision of a step-level public good by a seven-member 
group. The experimenter gave every player a $5 promissory note, which she could either keep 
or contribute. The group would receive a bonus of $70 to divide among its members if enough 
players contributed. The first experiment required three contributors, while the second and third 
experiments required five contributors. Id. at 1176-77, 1179. 
 72. Id. at 1175; see also id. at 1172 (providing a real-world example in which a group of 
state system faculty members used such a technique to raise money for a lobbyist); ELSTER, 
supra note 57, at 42 (discussing this “money-back” technique).  
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sufficient funds to produce the public good, the game forces everyone 
in the group to contribute their share.73 This eliminates the possibility 
of free riding.  
Interestingly, the Dawes study found that the enforced 
contribution condition produced significantly higher voluntary 
contribution levels, while the money-back guarantee failed to 
produce statistically significant changes in contribution levels.74 The 
authors conclude that “greed,” not “fear,” causes cooperation to fail.75 
In other words, the authors’ analysis suggests that people who switch 
from being noncontributors in the basic game to being contributors in 
the enforced contribution game are would-be free riders who no 
longer have an incentive to free ride under the enforced contribution 
requirement.76  
This analysis, like the expected value calculations discussed 
above, assumes that participants are indifferent to the payoffs of other 
people and wish only to maximize their own payoffs. Yet, people 
often seem to care about others’ payoffs. Expanding the model to 
take account of a more complex vision of human rationality yields a 
plausible alternative explanation for the results observed in the 
Dawes study. Importantly, this alternative explanation shows how we 
can reconcile those results with the relatively high baseline 
 
 73. Dawes et al., supra note 61, at 1175. In fact, the “enforced contribution” game was 
framed slightly differently, which might have impacted the results. The players all began with 
$5 and had the choice of whether to contribute. If there were enough contributions, each of the 
seven players would receive their $10 share of the bonus, but no player was allowed to receive 
more than $10. This cap effectively forced a contribution from each player. See id.  
 74. In one experiment, the enforced-contribution variation yielded contribution rates of 
86%, as compared with 51% in the standard dilemma setting. In a second experiment, the 
contribution rate in the enforced-contribution setting reached 93%, as compared with 64% in 
the standard dilemma context. Id. at 1176-78 & tbls.1-2. In the third experiment, which required 
subjects to make probability estimates, the contribution rate in the enforced-contribution setting 
was 77%, compared with a 23% contribution rate in the standard dilemma. Id. at 1180 tbl.3. 
The contribution levels for the money-back guarantee condition were 61%, 65%, and 43%, 
respectively. See id. at 1176-80 & tbls. 1-3 (presenting and discussing these results).  
 75. See id. at 1183 (positing, based on experimental results, that “[f]ear of loss through 
contributing is not the critical motivation underlying defection”; rather, “the relative success of 
the enforced contribution is consistent with the hypothesis that desire for gain through defecting 
is the motivation underlying defection”). 
 76. See id. (hypothesizing that “enforcing a contribution if a public good is provided 
works to promote contribution by convincing people that the good will be provided and by 
removing the opportunity for free riding if it is provided”).  
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contribution levels seen in many public goods games.  
Imagine that Aja is a fair-minded individual who wants to 
contribute to the public good. However, she suffers severe disutility if 
other people can free ride on her contributions. In other words, Aja is 
perfectly happy to accept the $1,000 net “contributor’s benefit” in the 
bridge example; indeed, this squares perfectly with her sense of 
equity. However, the thought that someone else could receive the 
$2,000 “free rider’s benefit” irks her to no end; she does not want 
someone to make her a “sucker.”77 Thus, Aja will most likely 
contribute in the “enforced contribution” situation. She contributes 
not because the “free rider’s benefit” is now unavailable to her, but 
because the free rider’s benefit is unavailable to others. The rules of 
enforced contribution require anyone who ends up benefiting from 
the contributions to pay their fair share.  
Under this interpretation, the potential pressures against 
contribution to a public good include not only fear and greed, but also 
“fear of greed”—the fear that greedy individuals will receive benefits 
without paying for them. This interpretation fits well with the 
experimental results in many public goods games. Some individuals 
begin cooperating, but cooperation decays over time.78 One 
interpretation that scholars have discredited through experimentation 
is that people learn to defect—that they learn how the game really 
works and come to appreciate the benefits of free riding.79 Another 
 
 77. See, e.g., Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory 
of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 390, 403 (1994) 
(“Human beings possess a very strong emotional desire not to be suckered”). Somewhat 
confusingly, the Dawes study also uses the word “suckered,” but to describe the very different 
situation in which a player makes a futile contribution. See Dawes et al., supra note 61, at 1175 
(observing that “subjects could still lose their contributions and be ‘suckered’” if enough other 
people did not contribute and the good was not provided). We think a critical component to the 
feeling of being “suckered” is the knowledge or belief that someone else benefits unfairly from 
one’s own contributions. This is consistent with the use of the term “sucker” in Prisoner’s 
Dilemma games. E.g., ANTHONY DE JASAY, SOCIAL CONTRACT, FREE RIDE: A STUDY OF THE 
PUBLIC GOODS PROBLEM 63-64 (1989) (applying “free rider” and “sucker” designations to the 
Prisoner's Dilemma); Jane J. Mansbridge, On the Relation of Altruism and Self-Interest, in 
BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 133, 141-42 & fig.8.1 (Jane Mansbridge ed., 1990) (discussing 
“sucker’s payoff” in conjunction with a prisoner’s dilemma matrix). 
 78. See, e.g., Fong et al., supra note 48, at 9-10. 
 79. See, e.g., id. at 10 (discussing research that suggests this explanation is invalid); see 
also Fehr & Gächter, supra note 37, at 164-65; URS FISCHBACHER ET AL., ARE PEOPLE 
CONDITIONALLY COOPERATIVE? EVIDENCE FROM A PUBLIC GOODS EXPERIMENT 9 (Univ. of 
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explanation has gained support: That people who start out 
cooperating stop in reaction to the non-cooperation of other group 
members.80 Often, the game structure permits no communication of 
one’s displeasure toward a defecting player other than defecting 
oneself.81 When devices to communicate through sanctions exist, 
group members use those devices instead of defecting.82  
Knowing whether greed or fear of greed acts as the dominant 
factor in unraveling cooperative action in these settings could provide 
useful insight in formulating a policy response to the collective action 
problem. If greed dominates, the individual player will act based on 
her perceptions of her own payoffs, including the sanctions that the 
other players can bring to bear against her in the event she attempts to 
free ride. If fear of greed dominates, the individual’s perception of 
the sanctions that she and others can bring to bear against other free 
riders determines her willingness to cooperate.83 
III. REAL-WORLD COMPLICATIONS IN TAX-FUNDED BENEFITS 
The public goods examples presented above, like much of the 
experimental literature within the public goods genre, seem to offer 
useful lessons for tax policy. These examples suggest that 
enforcement can play a facilitating role in eliciting cooperation to the 
extent it removes the temptation to free ride and the fear that others 
will succumb to that temptation.84 Applied to the taxation arena, it 
appears that people’s contributions are more a product of cooperation 
 
Zurich, Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 16, 2000), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/000106400.pdf? abstractid=203288. 
 80. Fehr & Gächter, supra note 37, at 162-63, 165 (observing that participants in repeat-
play experiments often employed principles of reciprocity to discipline self-interested 
participants to adopt more reciprocal responses in successive exchanges).  
 81. See, e.g., id. at 161-62; see also James Andreoni, Cooperation in Public Goods 
Experiments: Kindness or Confusion, 85 Am. ECON. REV. 891, 900 (1995) (concluding that 
thwarted attempts at kindness and cooperative behavior likely lead to the decay of cooperation 
in repeat-play games). 
 82. See, e.g., FALK et al., supra note 7, at 31-32. 
 83. This might seem to be a distinction without a difference, insofar as tougher 
enforcement would answer both concerns. Yet it may lead to subtly different rhetorical and 
policy strategies when employed in a real-world context involving heterogeneous actors. 
 84. See Dawes et al., supra note 61, at 1183-84 (observing that “[e]nforcing contribution 
should a public good be provided is, by this hypothesis, an institutional modification that is 
appropriately attuned to widespread, perhaps characteristic, human motivations”). 
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and less a product of compulsion in settings where people see that 
others who enjoy the public goods must make similar contributions. 
On this view, the compulsory nature of taxes should go far towards 
overcoming the resistance to contributing to public goods by 
addressing fears of free riding that can otherwise unravel public 
goods games. Indeed, free-rider concerns are often used to justify 
government provision of public goods.85 
However, we must proceed with caution in applying insights from 
stylized games involving small numbers of participants in 
experimental settings to any culturally-situated arena. The prevalence 
of the free riding concerns discussed above might increase or 
decrease in a given real-world tableau. In this Part, we discuss certain 
features of the federal income tax system that one might expect to 
heighten or complicate concerns about free riding, notwithstanding 
the existence of a compulsory collection system that in some measure 
replicates the “enforced contribution” condition. Additional studies 
that incorporate these features might refine our understanding of tax 
aversion. 
A. Disagreement About Ends 
The public goods typically at issue in experimental settings 
transparently benefit the players. Indeed, the public good in question 
is usually a cash bonus distributed among the players on a per capita 
basis.86 Where benefits are uncontroversially valuable, tangible, and 
easy to measure, players confront a stark conflict between collective 
and personal benefit maximization. When an individual fails to 
contribute in that context, she cannot claim that she thinks the public 
good in question is not worth providing—her noncontribution can 
only be interpreted as free riding.  
In contrast, people often have differing opinions about the value 
 
 85. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 2, at 64 (“Some suggest that the free rider problem 
necessarily leads to inefficient levels of public goods; therefore, efficiency requires government 
provision of such goods”).  
 86. Cf. Yoram Barzel & Tim R. Sass, The Allocation of Resources by Voting, 105 Q. J. 
ECON. 745, 752 (1990) (observing that “harmony” in individual voters’ interests “is relatively 
easy to achieve in projects that provide only pecuniary benefits, but harder to achieve when 
projects also provide their owners direct consumption”).  
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of real-world public goods. Hence, noncontributors may not be 
expressing a greedy desire to free ride, nor even a fear that others will 
do so, but rather a genuine disinterest in the provided good. Of 
course, it is often difficult to determine noncontributors’ true 
motivations. Free riders often employ a stratagem of falsely 
announcing that they do not value a public good, in the hopes that 
others will pay for it.87  
Some contexts make testing the truthfulness of participants’ 
representations about their preferences easier than others. To return to 
the bridge example, we could announce that only contributors of a set 
amount (for example, the $1,000 fair share) will receive passes that 
will allow them to use the bridge if completed.88 Unlike the enforced 
contribution condition, this system ensures that no person will have 
to contribute if she actually attaches a lower value to the good than 
the enforced contribution amount. However, this solution is 
unworkable where exclusion from a good is difficult.  
The enforced contribution version of the public goods game does 
not permit as fine-grained a customization of a good’s provision and 
funding as would the system just described, but it does provide an 
interesting proxy mechanism for assessing the popularity of the 
public good. In the first phase of the enforced contribution public 
goods game, the voluntary contributions amount to a monetary “vote” 
for the provision of the public good. If the vote carries, then everyone 
who benefits must contribute. Our political system does not offer a 
direct monetary vote through which a government body can 
aggregate preferences in a manner that accounts for their intensity.89 
 
 87. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 2, at 63 (explaining that “people may have incentives to 
hide their true preferences for a public good”). While economic analysis often assumes that 
people will hide their true preferences in order to free ride, the extent to which people actually 
engage in such self-serving behavior is empirically questionable. See Earl R. Brubaker, Free 
Ride, Free Revelation, or Golden Rule?, 18 J. L. & ECON. 147 (1975) (questioning this 
assumption and discussing research findings in which expressed demand for a collective good 
did not appear to suffer from severe free ridership distortions).  
 88. This could be coupled with a money-back guarantee in the event the bridge is not 
built. 
 89. See Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111, 113-16 (2000) 
(discussing conventional explanations for prohibition of vote buying and selling). Of course, 
those with intense, money-backed preferences can attempt to exert indirect influence on 
political outcomes. See, e.g., id. at 129 (discussing “indirect vote buying,” which includes 
individual contributions to campaigns and to organizations backing particular candidates and 
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Moreover, people typically vote for representatives rather than on 
issues in isolation.90 This blunts people’s ability to signal preferences 
about specific public goods.  
In contexts where the public good in question is unambiguously 
more valuable than the contributions participants are called upon to 
make, a compulsory collective mechanism adds value by solving a 
collective action problem. But when we recognize the possibility that 
people might genuinely disagree about whether and to what extent 
particular goods generate benefits, the compulsory nature of the 
collection mechanism takes on a different cast.91 Compulsory 
collections from those who genuinely attach a lower value to the 
provided good than to the amount of their enforced contributions are 
not coordinating unambiguously valuable action; rather they are 
coercing people to make contributions that are of negative value to 
them.92 Taxpayers might view compulsion as presumptively 
undesirable and justifiable only when accompanied by a 
countervailing benefit—when the compulsion delivers to each 
 
causes); Thomas Stratmann, The Market for Congressional Votes: Is the Timing of 
Contributions Everything?, 41 J. L. & ECON. 85 (1998) (presenting empirical work addressing 
the extent to which Political Action Committees make contributions that are designed to 
influence congressional votes on particular issues). 
 90.  See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD & MICHAEL D. COHEN, HARNESING COMPLEXITY 128 
(2000) (observing that “voters are not able to pick and choose among the features they like in 
the incumbent and a challenger”). 
 91. See Brubaker, supra note 87, at 156 (explaining that a compulsory collection system 
overcomes the problem of “free riding” only by introducing the possibility of “forced-riding”—
enforced collections from those who do not, in fact, value the good to the extent of the 
collection). 
 92. In local taxation contexts, people with similar tastes in public goods might efficiently 
cluster together, eliminating some of these concerns. See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, FISCAL 
SYSTEMS 299 (1969) (positing that “it is efficient for people with similar tastes in social goods 
to reside together”). The Tiebout hypothesis is premised on precisely such clustering. See 
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 422 (1956) 
(explaining that consumers make choices among communities just as they make choices among 
goods in private markets, so that “[s]patial mobility provides the local public-goods counterpart 
to the private market’s shopping trip”). However, this clustering can lead to a larger-scale free 
rider problem among local municipalities where people are heterogeneous not only with regard 
to tastes but also with regard to resources. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. 
Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 730-33 (N.J. 1975) (recognizing temptation for a 
growing municipality to seek only that form of growth that will enhance its tax base by 
excluding the poor, to the detriment of the surrounding region); Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 
112 YALE L.J. 617, 652-54 (2002) (book review) (discussing municipal incentives to shift the 
costs of poverty to other jurisdictions). 
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individual a state of the world that she values more highly than the 
state of the world without such contributions or provided goods. If 
many public goods are provided, some of which generate a surplus 
for the taxpayer and some of which generate a deficit, this criterion 
would be satisfied as long as the net result is positive for a given 
taxpayer. Nevertheless, we should keep this concern in mind to the 
extent that it becomes empirically plausible to suppose that certain 
categories of taxpayers have their interests consistently overridden. 
B. Factoring in Intentional Redistribution 
Public goods games are interesting because they involve the risk 
of cross-subsidization of some players by other players. In this sense, 
the prospect of unintentional redistribution always looms in the 
background. However, public goods games typically do not involve 
an intentional or structured effort to benefit certain players at the 
expense of others. Nor do these experiments involve players who 
command different resources within the context of the game. In 
contrast, a real society includes people who are heterogeneous with 
regard to resources. Moreover, a good deal of taxation effects 
redistribution by design.93  
We can analytically recast redistribution as a public good.94 The 
new distribution pattern itself might be seen as a public good,95 or it 
can generate collateral public goods by providing a minimal level of 
subsistence to the citizenry, thereby creating a society in which 
children receive adequate nutrition and in which people do not 
languish in impoverishment.96 However, problems remain.  
First, deep political and philosophical differences exist about 
 
 93. See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 30, at 76 (describing the role that taxation 
plays “in determining how the social product is shared out among different individuals” as one 
of its “two primary functions”); Eric Rakowski, Transferring Wealth Liberally, 51 TAX L. REV. 
419, 438 (1996) (listing redistribution as a principal goal of taxation).  
 94. Wil Arts & Peter van Wijck, Share and Share Alike? Social Constraints on Income 
Equalization, 3 SOC. JUST. RES. 233, 235 (1989) (characterizing income distribution as a public 
good). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Interdependence and Choice in Distributive Justice: The 
Welfare Conundrum, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 235, 267-74 (1994) (discussing costs to non-poor 
associated with poverty). 
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whether redistribution is, or could be said to generate, a public good. 
Second, those who benefit directly and monetarily from redistribution 
receive, by definition, a higher level of benefits than those who 
receive just the ambient public good associated with the 
redistribution (the monetary beneficiaries receive both the ambient 
good and a check). Also, the recipients of the redistribution will not 
make positive net contributions to that redistribution.97 Finally, free 
riding can operate because at least some potential “net recipients” 
control some of the factors that could place them in a position to be a 
“net recipient” in a particular round of play. 
An example illustrates some dimensions of the problem. Imagine 
ten individuals are about to embark on a group expedition through a 
wilderness area in winter, a joint enterprise in which the well-being 
of all the group members will matter. Before beginning, it becomes 
apparent that two of the ten participants lack a warm winter hat, an 
essential piece of survival equipment. A hat store nearby offers new 
expedition-warmth hats for $20.00 each, but the hatless participants 
have no money. Equipping both of the hatless group members 
requires $40.00 in contributions from the group, or $5.00 from each 
of the eight moneyed members of the group.  
Supplying hats to the hatless accomplishes two things. First, it 
effects a tangible redistribution from the hatted to the hatless; each 
hatless person gains a $20.00 value, while each hatted person must 
contribute $5.00. Second, it generates a suitably-dressed expedition 
cohort (a valuable public good) for the group. Even if this is not 
deemed valuable in itself, a number of valuable collateral goods may 
flow from the redistribution: that the group does not have to see any 
of its members perish from hypothermia en route, that pity does not 
move a member of the group to give up essential clothing in the 
middle of the expedition, that a desperately cold, hatless person does 
not assault another group member to obtain a hat, or that the 
expedition is not interrupted by the need to call for (and potentially 
finance) emergency medical assistance.  
Of course, the hatless individuals who receive the direct benefits 
 
 97. Of course, the possibility exists that they might literally make contributions. However, 
in order for redistribution to occur, they will always receive all these contributions back, plus a 
surplus, making their net contribution to the good negative.  
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from the hats also benefit from the public good of a well-dressed 
expedition cohort; the other group members receive only the ambient 
public good. Where redistribution is the point of a collective 
contribution arrangement, participants on the receiving end of the 
redistribution will always receive larger net benefits than the 
participants who subsidize them. This means that some of the 
participants necessarily occupy the position of full or partial free 
riders, at least within a given round of the game. Because the term 
“free rider” usually carries the connotation of strategic exploitation, 
we dub those recipients who free ride out of necessity “needy riders.”  
An enforced contribution scheme like that outlined by Dawes and 
his co-authors cannot address needy riding; it defeats the purpose of 
redistribution to force the recipients to pay their fair share for the 
benefits received. Yet if each individual at least partially controls the 
factors that determine whether she meets the criteria for receiving 
redistribution, making structural provision for needy riding 
encounters problems. Not only might the prospect of a free ride tempt 
some group members to put themselves into a position that makes 
them eligible for redistributive benefits, but it might also cause other 
members of the group to fear potential free riding (masquerading as 
needy riding) on the part of others, a prospect to which they may 
react by refusing to contribute.  
Thus, the redistributive element adds a new concern about free 
riding recipients (faux needy riding) without ameliorating the original 
concern about free riding among contributors that is endemic to the 
provision of even non-redistributive public goods. To put this in 
terms of our expedition example, a given would-be contributor must 
concern herself not only with strategic hatlessness, but also with the 
possibility that other hatted people will choose not to contribute so as 
to gain the ambient benefits of a well-dressed expedition cohort at the 
expense of the other hatted people. There are now two independent 
ways in which cooperation might unravel, because there are two 
avenues for potential free riding and two ways to become a “sucker.”  
A certain destructive synergy may result. For example, imagine 
two would-be contributors, Cody and Chako. Cody believes that the 
hatless people are really strategic free riders in disguise and refuses to 
contribute. Chako interprets this refusal as a greedy desire on the part 
of Cody to free ride on the poverty relief efforts of the other group 
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members, and Chako therefore retaliates by refusing to contribute. 
An enforced contribution requirement could solve this problem, but it 
requires adding a means-test to determine whether one is among the 
“contribution eligible” or, instead, eligible to receive the benefits of 
redistribution. In the hat example, this requires equipment and funds 
checks to see who should contribute and who may receive 
contributions. Such a test might superficially solve the problem of 
free riding among those identified as contributors, but it would in turn 
heighten concerns about strategic behavior designed to keep one from 
being identified as a contributor.  
Finding ways to minimize strategic self-qualification for 
assistance increases the likelihood of cooperation from all able 
contributors.98 Society can, for example, choose conditions for 
redistribution that fall clearly outside the control of the recipients. 
The concern that would-be contributors will attempt to strategically 
present themselves as needy riders disappears when we base 
redistribution on a characteristic difficult to bring about voluntarily 
and very hard to fake, such as old age or permanent disability. 
Likewise, need that is the product of events clearly out of the victims’ 
control, such as a natural disaster or a terrorist attack, avoids such 
self-qualification concerns. 
Furthermore, certain conditions requiring assistance are not only 
outside of individual control, but result from risks spread broadly 
across the population. Redistribution in such settings carries the 
flavor of insurance; individuals want to provide for people harmed by 
forces outside of their control, at least in part because these 
individuals could have been (or still might be) in the harmed person’s 
shoes. However, if a person knows with virtual certainty that she 
does not face particular risks, the “self-insurance” function of 
 
 98.  See Amy Wax, Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the Political Economy of 
Welfare Reform, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257, 268 (2000) (arguing that “tolerating 
voluntary self-qualification for aid is inconsistent with sustaining a voluntary cooperative 
agreement”). In the hat example, self-qualification might be limited by waiting to announce the 
redistributive scheme until after the individuals have reported for the expedition. If the 
individuals did not have any idea that redistribution would be provided, the possibility of 
redistribution could not have an impact on their decisions to show up hatless or without funds. 
For obvious reasons, this tactic is not workable for ongoing, society-wide public assistance 
schemes. 
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redistribution would disappear for her with regard to those risks.  
The breadth of an individual’s definition of the category of 
persons receiving redistributive assistance affects contributors’ 
perceptions of whether this self-insurance function exists in a given 
scenario. If we frame redistribution broadly to help people in a 
variety of situations outside of individual control, contributors may 
desire the redistribution in a repeat-play setting where they can 
contemplate becoming a recipient in a later round or stage of the 
interaction. Conversely, if a particular program deals only with a 
problem that most members of the population believe they will not 
likely face (such as chronic poverty that exists independent of the 
usual “good excuses” of old age, disability, or disaster), the self-
insurance justification loses its persuasiveness. 
There are several additional features of our 10-person expedition 
example that do not exist in a nationwide tax and transfer scheme. 
First, the people who benefit from redistribution in the expedition 
example are readily identifiable and will continue to be engaged in an 
ongoing enterprise with the contributors. This enables the 
contributors to see, first-hand, how their donations are being used. In 
addition, the benefits themselves are provided in a form (here, hats) 
that comports with majoritarian assessments of the recipients’ needs. 
The scenario does not allow recipients to sell their new warm hats to 
purchase, for example, lottery tickets, alcohol, or cigarettes, even if 
they might prefer these other consumption alternatives.  
Second, the trope of the expedition provides a built-in structure 
for potential reciprocity. Those who receive hats from the group 
might feel a stronger obligation to the group; they might be more 
willing to undertake extraordinary efforts for the group if some 
eventuality, such as an accident, made this effort necessary. 
Finally, it is clear in this example how the hatlessness of some 
members could harm the enterprise as a whole. In the expedition 
setting, the fates of all group members are intertwined, making their 
utility functions transparently interdependent. In a larger societal 
context, many would bridle at the notion that we are all on anything 
like an “expedition” together or that a common interest binds us all to 
the fates of each other so as to provide a basis for a societal 
redistributive scheme. Some would-be contributors would deny 
receiving any ambient benefits at all from the redistributive scheme, 
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and would profess profound disinterest in the fates of any individuals 
other than family members and chosen associates. Such potential 
contributors would therefore resent the enforced contribution 
condition, despite its capacity to address the problem of free riding 
among contributors. 
Other would-be contributors might perceive that some ambient 
benefits potentially flow from redistribution, but would view other 
measures available to them as cheaper means for securing those same 
benefits. For example, a potential contributor who believes that 
desperate, impoverished people are more likely to commit crime and 
less likely to succeed in school might welcome an ambient benefit 
arising from redistribution to the poor to lower the crime rate and 
make inner city schools better. However, the would-be contributor 
might perceive that another option can secure many of the same 
safety and educational benefits: insulating herself and her children 
from the poor in an exclusive suburb or private community and 
sending her children to an exclusive suburban or private school. If 
this alternative costs less (including not just the monetary cost, but 
also the emotional cost associated with the worry about being 
“suckered”), the would-be contributor might resent any requirement 
that she contribute to redistribution. Thus, legal features outside the 
federal tax and transfer realm are likely to affect the alternatives 
available to potential contributors, and these alternatives will in turn 
influence the potential contributors’ acceptance of redistributive 
arrangements. 
C. Progressivity  
Other structural features of the tax system, such as the degree of 
progressivity, may further complicate the array of alternatives and 
choices facing participants. Progressivity in contributions is tightly 
connected to redistributive concerns, but deserves separate 
consideration. First, we should distinguish (i) a progressive tax, in 
which those with higher income (or wealth, or other measure of well-
being) contribute a larger percentage,99 from (ii) a flat tax, in which 
 
 99.  See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE 
GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 50 & n.4 (1996) (defining an income tax as progressive “if 
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all contributors pay the same percentage, but those with more income 
pay more in absolute terms. We can then readily distinguish both of 
these schemes from a per capita “head tax,” in which all individuals 
pay the same amount, regardless of income.  
To justify the move from a head tax to a flat income tax, one 
might argue that those with higher income receive a higher level of 
benefits from the public goods in question so that their higher 
contribution actually represents their “fair share,” given the benefits 
received.100 Looking at the bridge example, if we imagine that the 
existence of the bridge saves each player thirty minutes in commuting 
time each day, the value of that time will differ among individuals. A 
high-income attorney with a billing rate of $400 per hour benefits by 
$200 each day, while a fast-food worker who earns $10 an hour 
benefits by a mere $5 each day.101 Similar arguments can be made 
with greater or lesser degrees of success for other public goods. In 
general, wealthier people have more to lose from the breakdown of 
social order, and hence gain more from governmental institutions that 
preserve order.102  
Progressivity involves collecting a higher percentage of tax from 
those with higher incomes. Even if we accept the argument that a 
reasonably tight correspondence exists between the benefits received 
through taxation and the tax base (income), then it remains the case 
 
an individual’s or family’s total tax liability, as a fraction of income, rises with income,” and 
explaining that the same definition would apply to a tax based on “any alternative measure of 
well-being”). 
 100. A related, but distinct, argument would posit that those with higher income or wealth 
have, self-evidently, already received disproportionately large amounts of benefits from “the 
system” as a whole; otherwise these individuals would not have enjoyed such economic 
success. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 30, at 17 (observing that we might view “people’s 
actual levels of welfare, with government in place, as a rough measure of the benefit conveyed 
to them by government”). On this account, a progressive tax system amounts, in part, to a 
payback for high levels of benefits received elsewhere. This argument is vulnerable to the usual 
counter that individual success reflects many factors (e.g., hard work, luck, personal 
endowments) for which the state cannot claim credit.  
 101. Even where high-income individuals receive most of their income through 
investments, rather than earnings, these individuals will likely value their time highly. One 
might measure this value by the amounts these individuals expend to save time in various ways.  
 102. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 99, at 53 (explaining that the “benefit principle” 
of taxation “suggests that the tax burden should be higher for households with higher income 
and wealth, because these people have more to lose from the anarchy that would prevail if the 
government withdrew from providing defense, a justice system, police and so on”).  
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that a fully progressive scheme involves some measure of cross-
subsidization from the better-off to the less well-off. We can defend 
this subsidization on the ground that the better-off have a greater 
ability to pay.103 We can augment this assertion by citing the 
diminishing marginal utility of money, which makes removal of a 
larger percentage off the top of a much larger stack of dollars hurt no 
more than taking a smaller percentage off the top of a smaller stack 
of dollars.104 To the extent progressivity contributes to distributive 
goals, we could couch this as a public good. 
Building redistribution into the tax structure itself may have 
advantages over a simpler (head or flat) taxation scheme followed by 
additional transfers to achieve the same result. One advantage is 
purely administrative in nature. Taxing people who subsequently 
receive net positive transfer payments to achieve distributive goals 
moves money around needlessly. Progressive taxes also seem to 
enjoy popular support, although people seem to view them less 
favorably when confronted with examples that reveal how these taxes 
actually work.105  
 
 103.  See id. at 54 (discussing the “ability to pay” principle of fair taxation). 
 104.  See id. (presenting this argument, but noting that it is also “unprovable” because of the 
impossibility of making interpersonal utility comparisons). 
 105. Despite broad popular support for progressivity as a concept, the results of one study 
that asked respondents to answer concrete questions about fair taxation “do not indicate that a 
majority of the sample prefer taxes that increase progressively, that is, more than 
proportionately to increases in income.” Michael L. Roberts et al., Understanding Attitudes 
Toward Progressive Taxation, 58 PUB. OP. Q. 165, 185 (1994). The authors suggest that the 
public perception that well-off people do not pay a proportionate share of their income in taxes, 
given the differential availability of tax avoidance opportunities, might explain this apparent 
discrepancy. See id. at 185-86. Another explanation suggests that people do not fully appreciate, 
or cannot readily process, the difference between flat taxes that take more money (but the same 
percentage) from the better-off, with truly progressive taxes that take a larger percentage from 
the better-off. For example, it appears that people are susceptible to a “progressivity illusion” 
when taxes are expressed in dollar rather than percentage terms. See EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY & 
JONATHAN BARON, FRAMING THE FAMILY: EVALUATION OF TAX POLICIES INVOLVING 
HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION 14, 30, 33, 36 (USC Law School, Olin Research Paper No. 00-18, 
Revised, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID246408_ 
code001023520. pdf?abstractid=246408 (discussing this effect). 
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D. Opportunities for Avoidance and Evasion 
Where public goods games involve a forced contribution feature, 
as did one of the experimental games in the Dawes study, the forced 
contribution can be implemented perfectly.106 In contrast, any real-
world tax system includes opportunities for legal tax avoidance and 
illegal tax evasion. Tax avoidance is generated by intentional or 
unintentional gaps in the tax base that enable people to reduce tax 
liability by selectively engaging in particular activities. Tax evasion 
is a function of necessarily imperfect enforcement regimes. Scholars 
have extensively analyzed the costs associated with tax avoidance 
and evasion.107 While we will not revisit those topics in detail here, 
opportunities for avoidance and evasion might impact tax aversion by 
presenting opportunities for free riding.108  
As noted at the outset, instances of tax avoidance and evasion are 
likely manifestations of tax aversion. It remains possible, however, 
that they also exacerbate and perpetuate tax aversion. The dynamic is 
similar to a simple public goods game in which baseline levels of 
cooperation decay over time. Some people begin as noncooperators, 
while others become noncooperators in reaction to the 
noncooperation of other people. As in the public goods game, 
taxpayers may believe that to avoid victimization from free riding, a 
taxpayer must become a free rider herself. In other words, if 
taxpayers perceive the game as offering a binary choice between 
being a free rider or being a sucker, some number of would-be 
cooperators will choose free riding, or at least the partial free riding 
that accompanies tax avoidance or evasion.  
Prohibiting all free riding would make these “reactive” free riders 
happiest, but given a world in which some people do free ride, these 
reactive people wish to be among the free riders.109 Thus, closing up 
 
 106. Dawes et al., supra note 61, at 1175-78. 
 107. See supra notes 9, 12 (citing studies on tax evasion, avoidance and compliance 
issues). 
 108. Some gaps in the tax base are intentional. If the behavioral shifts induced by these 
gaps generate societal benefits that outweigh the lost revenue, then those who “avoid” taxes by 
engaging in tax-preferred behaviors do not free ride. However, just as the uses of tax revenue 
may be controversial, so too may be these tax preferences. See generally CITIZENS FOR TAX 
JUSTICE, THE HIDDEN ENTITLEMENTS (1996) (criticizing certain tax expenditures). 
 
 109. Such reactive free riding parallels the phenomenon of conditional cooperation found 
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gaps in the tax base or toughening enforcement might decrease free 
riding in two ways: by actually keeping people from free riding, and 
by making people believe that nobody else can get away with such 
free riding. If most avoiders and evaders are of the “reactive” variety, 
setting up a system that minimizes free riding should decrease tax 
aversion. 
Standard economic analysis posits that an optimum level of 
enforcement exists. It is inefficient to catch every tax cheat; the 
efficient solution minimizes the sum of evasion costs and 
administrative and enforcement costs.110 Similar analysis has been 
applied to tax avoidance devices, such as tax shelters. If these 
avoidance devices generate costly deadweight losses, perhaps making 
avoidance easier for those who wish to avoid taxes will actually be 
more efficient.111 Yet if some proportion of avoidance and evasion is 
of the “reactive” variety, then the optimum level of enforcement must 
take into account the impact that instances of avoidance and evasion 
could have on norms of compliance. Tightening up enforcement 
might have a multiplier effect in inducing and sustaining cooperation; 
in addition to increasing deterrence, enforcement might also reduce 
the fear of free-riding by fostering a public perception that free riding 
is not going to be tolerated.  
Tax aversion also generates costs other than those captured by 
avoidance and evasion behaviors. Wage-earning taxpayers who 
cannot cobble together enough deductions to itemize have little 
opportunity to evade or avoid taxation.112 Yet to the extent that taxes 
cause them more pain than other expenditures of similar magnitude, 
there is a social utility loss. Thus, even enforcement that appears 
inefficient when compared with the amount of evasion detected or 
deterred might actually yield latent benefits in the reduction of tax 
 
in experimental economics studies. See, e.g., FISCHBACHER ET AL., supra note 79; Keser & van 
Winden, supra note 7; see also Jon S. Davis et al., Social Behaviors, Enforcement, and Tax 
Compliance Dynamics, 78 ACCT. REV. 39 (2003) (modeling dynamics of compliance norms 
and behaviors among taxpayers). 
 110. See Becker, supra note 4, at 183-84.  
 111. See Weisbach, supra note 2, at 1669-71. 
 112. See Henry S.J. Robben et al., Decision Frame and Opportunity as Determinants of 
Tax Cheating, 11 J. ECON. PSYCH. 341, 347 (1990) (observing that “[t]axpayers vary in terms 
of the opportunities available to them to conceal income or declare unwarranted deductions 
without risking detection”). 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 75 Fennell.doc  9/22/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
114 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 13:75 
 
aversion. If we care about addressing tax aversion itself, and not just 
its most obvious manifestations, then the role of enforcement in 
shaping attitudes towards contributing to taxes deserves independent 
attention.  
Nevertheless, enforcement is a double-edged sword that can 
produce unintentional results. For those presently in compliance, the 
existence of extensive enforcement efforts may signal that free riding 
is in fact rampant—a signal that might lead to more 
noncompliance.113 In addition, an IRS that is perceived as 
overzealous in prosecuting offenses may be viewed as treating 
taxpayers unfairly or with undue levels of suspicion, thus generating 
additional resentment about the tax system.114 If the fact of 
compulsion itself adds distaste to the tax payment context, heightened 
enforcement efforts may operate to highlight the compulsory aspects 
of the system, rather than the more “service-oriented” side of the 
IRS’s operations.  
IV. THE ROLE OF RECIPROCITY 
Part III suggests that a real-world tax system, notwithstanding its 
compulsory nature (and perhaps in part because of it), will continue 
to contain features that generate aversion. A significant part of that 
 
 113. The Minnesota Department of Revenue conducted a study in 1995 that showed the 
converse of this trend. The Department sent informational letters to a sample of state taxpayers, 
informing them that tax compliance rates were in fact higher than the levels suggested in recent 
public opinion polls. Those taxpayers thereafter reported more income and claimed fewer 
deductions in their state tax returns. STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, THE 
MINNESOTA INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS 5-6, 18-19 (1996), 
available at http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/reports/complnce.pdf. A later study examined 
changes in tax reporting conduct on both state and federal income tax returns, using a different 
selection of data sets than those employed in the Minnesota Department of Revenue’s study. 
This later study found no statistically significant impact of the informational letters when 
assessed with those different data sets. Marsha Blumenthal et al., Do Normative Appeals Affect 
Tax Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 125 
(2001). For a detailed discussion of these and other studies on norms of tax compliance, see 
Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 
OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2003), George Mason Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics 
Working Paper No. 3-12, 2003, at 18-21 & nn.87-112, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=391133. 
 114. See, e.g., FREY & FELD, supra note 12, at 23 (observing that “when the tax officials 
consider taxpayers purely as ‘subjects’ who have to be forced to pay their dues, the taxpayers 
tend to respond by actively trying to avoid taxation”). 
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aversion relates to concerns about free riding. We can obtain a deeper 
and richer understanding of what those concerns entail and how we 
might ameliorate them from anthropological and sociological studies 
of the phenomenon of reciprocity. Such analyses have identified 
cross-cultural trends in belief systems and norms of conduct that are 
consistent with findings in controlled experiments indicating that 
reciprocity plays a central role in the success of repeat-play 
interactions. 
A. Structures and Scales of Reciprocity 
Anthropological and sociological studies of exchange systems 
across cultures indicate that exchange participants tend to prefer 
balanced, reciprocal exchanges over systems of centralized collection 
and redistribution.115 Within systems of balanced reciprocity, 
participants provide resources (human capital, goods, and services) to 
each other on the understanding that they will receive clearly 
comparable resource contributions in return. Such systems permit 
delays, but the reciprocation must occur within reasonably 
contemporaneous time spans. If participants in these exchange 
systems obtain contributions without reciprocating in kind, other 
contributors typically subject these non-reciprocating participants to 
social condemnation, invoking social norms of expected degrees of 
fairness in the exchanges. In addition, such failures of reciprocity 
frequently result in participants’ avoidance of future exchanges with 
noncontributing members of the exchange system.116  
Public good experiments have examined the reciprocal 
interactions of limited numbers of participants in face-to-face 
interactions. These experiments have provided useful findings of the 
 
 115. See, e.g., MAURICE GODELIER, THE ENIGMA OF THE GIFT (Nora Scott trans., 1999); 
ANNETTE B. WIENER, INALIENABLE POSSESSIONS: THE PARADOX OF KEEPING-WHILE-GIVING 
(1992); Marshall Sahlins, On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange, in THE GIFT 26 (Aafke E. 
Komter ed., 1996). 
 116. PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 4-6 (Richard Nice trans., 
1977); CHRISTOPHER A. GREGORY, SAVAGE MONEY: THE ANTHROPOLOGY AND POLITICS OF 
COMMODITY EXCHANGE 64-65 (1997); WEINER, supra note 115, at 28-33; Arjun Appadurai, 
Commodities and the Politics of Value, in THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THINGS 18-20 (Arjun Appadurai 
ed., 1986); Henry Orenstein, Asymmetrical Reciprocity: A Contribution to the Theory of 
Political Legitimacy, 21 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 69, 69-70 (1980). 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 75 Fennell.doc  9/22/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 13:75 
 
degree to which members of Western societies have been socialized 
with norms of reciprocation that often dominate over desires for self-
interested maximization. However, one cannot directly extrapolate 
findings involving limited networks of face-to-face interactions to 
settings involving social actors engaged in more abstract interactions 
with centralized institutions. Nonetheless, the findings from 
experiments concerning face-to-face interactions provide useful 
insights, because small-scale networks form the building blocks of 
the larger, centralized institutions which are of concern for a study of 
tax aversion dynamics in American taxation. 
In cultural systems with centralized institutions for collecting and 
redistributing resources, the mechanisms of social interaction and 
organization operate on both small and large scales. At the smaller 
scale, social integration is maintained through reciprocal, largely 
face-to-face interactions of individual actors within particular groups. 
At the larger scale, there are less face-to-face interactions of 
participants, and instead a greater role for institutional forms of 
communication and action between groups representing those 
individuals. The larger-scale systemic integration is built upon, and 
depends upon, the closer-scale modes of social integration.117  
Taxpayers in systems of centralized redistribution often perceive 
those exchange systems as involving degrees of expropriation 
because the levels of taxation and other required contributions do not 
appear justifiable on the basis of clearly identifiable public goods 
received in return. As a result, groups controlling the collection and 
redistribution systems develop and utilize other elements of social 
structure to counter the participants’ aversion to making such 
contributions, and to deter noncompliance.118 These elements include 
institutions for imposing the controlling groups’ power over the 
participants, and elaborate ideologies that legitimate their authority 
 
 117. See, e.g., ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY: ACTION, 
STRUCTURE AND CONTRADICTION IN SOCIAL ANALYSIS 76-81 (1979); WEINER, supra note 
115, at 29-30; ERIC R. WOLF, PATHWAYS OF POWER: BUILDING AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE 
MODERN WORLD 167-68 (2001).  
 118. See, e.g., ABNER COHEN, TWO-DIMENSIONAL MAN: AN ESSAY ON THE 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF POWER AND SYMBOLISM IN COMPLEX SOCIETY 119-38 (1976); Jonathan 
Friedman, Culture, Identity and World Process, in DOMINATION AND RESISTANCE 246-60 
(Daniel Miller et al. eds., 1989); Orenstein, supra note 116, at 70-73. 
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within the society.119  
In smaller-scale interactions of identifiable participants, each 
participant tends to judge the fairness of the interaction by her 
perceptions of each other participant’s behavior and motivations. 
This is consistent with results of experimental studies showing that 
the perceived motives of other players matter greatly in assessments 
of fairness by a given player.120 Thus, participants express norms of 
reciprocation to reward or punish others in these smaller-scale 
interactions.121 When the forum of interaction moves to a broader 
scale, however, the focus of individual participants falls more on the 
perceived character of the things exchanged (whether in amounts of 
money capital, human capital, or commodities) and the fairness of the 
exchange of values conveyed through those items.122 One 
interpretation of this shift in focus is that individual participants’ 
motives become more difficult to accurately assess as group size 
increases. Therefore, a participant must rely on the perceived values 
of the goods received and given to assess whether her partners in the 
interaction treated her fairly. 
Alvin Gouldner’s broad survey of anthropological and 
sociological studies of the norm of reciprocity across cultures found 
that this norm is practically a universal component of cultural 
systems.123 However, the particular characteristics and dynamics of a 
norm of reciprocity can vary significantly among cultural settings. 
Reciprocity exists not only in smaller social groups engaged in 
ritualized gift exchange, but also in larger social settings where 
reciprocity entails an interdependence of participants in an increasing 
 
 119. See, e.g., Orenstein, supra note 116, at 70-73. 
 120. See, e.g., Fong et al., supra note 48, at 8-9 (explaining that in ultimatum and dictator 
games, “[p]unishment is triggered by responders’ beliefs about the intentions of the proposer”). 
 121. See, e.g., Igor Kopytoff, The Cultural Biography of Things: Commodification as 
Process, in THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THINGS 68-70 (Arjun Appadurai ed., 1986). 
 122. See, e.g., LOUIS DUMONT, FROM MANDEVILLE TO MARX: THE GENESIS AND 
TRIUMPH OF ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY 5-6 (1977); GREGORY, supra note 116; WEINER, supra note 
115, at 28-30; Duran Bell, Modes of Exchange: Gift and Commodity, 20 J. OF SOCIO-
ECONOMICS 155, 165 (1991); Edward L. Schieffelin, Reciprocity and the Construction of 
Reality, 15 MAN (n. s.) 502 (Sept. 1980); see also Appadurai, supra note 116, at 11-12. 
 123. Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, 25 AM. SOC. 
REV. 161, 171 (1960). While some aspects of Gouldner’s analysis received criticism due to 
contrary evidence in later ethnographic studies, several key features of reciprocity described by 
Gouldner remain supported by a broad array of anthropological research efforts. 
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division and specialization of labor, as well as the exchange of 
capital, goods, and services.124  
In its most basic characteristics across cultures, a norm of 
reciprocity “makes two interrelated, minimal demands: (1) people 
should help those who have helped them, and (2) people should not 
injure those who have helped them.”125 In some cultures, reciprocity 
acts as a fundamental organizing principle in the operations of 
political and economic institutions of centralized governments.126 In 
other large-scale and complex cultural systems, such as the United 
States, the political and economic institutions of centralized 
government have become rationalized and legitimized in the belief 
systems of that culture.127 In such contexts, the operations of 
reciprocity may remain “endemic” among members of the culture, 
but are not carried out overtly in the operations of these centralized 
economic institutions.128  
A primary aspect of reciprocity that varies from one cultural 
setting to another is the way in which participants affix values to 
particular things exchanged, and thereby determine what things have 
equivalent values within the context of their exchanges. In many 
cultural systems, “equivalence may mean that the things exchanged 
may be completely different, but should be equal in value as defined 
by the actors in the situation.”129 In other cultures and group 
interactions, “equivalence may mean that exchanges should be 
concretely alike, or identical in form, either with respect to the things 
exchanged or to the circumstances under which they are 
exchanged.”130  
A number of anthropological studies of reciprocal exchange 
systems have found that loss avoidance is a key concern. For 
example, Schieffelin examined the role of a norm of reciprocity in the 
creation and maintenance of social ties among the Kaluli people of 
 
 124. Id. at 169-70. 
 125. Id. at 171.  
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 172. 
 130. Id. 
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Papua New Guinea.131 Even in exchanges among smaller groups of 
identifiable participants, the actors perceived the things they 
exchanged as imbued with cultural meaning that provided a basis for 
placing particular valuations on each exchanged thing. When one 
participant conveyed an item of value to another, it created an 
imbalance between them until the recipient responded by conveying 
something to the donor of equivalent value under the circumstances 
of the relationship. The Kaluhi people thus perceive reciprocity as 
being driven by the social necessity of redressing the loss sustained 
by the first donor in order to restore and maintain the ongoing social 
relationships between that donor and the recipient. Therefore, 
exchanges were motivated not just by the positive value of enhancing 
social relationships through donations, but also by the converse fear 
of sustaining unredressed losses and a breakdown in the social order 
of the exchange network.132 
What relevance does such a reciprocity norm have in a setting in 
which an institutionalized governmental body compels payments 
from individuals, and where different classes of people are stratified 
economically and politically into a hierarchy of different status 
levels? In such a setting, one would expect social actors of higher 
status to extract benefits from participants of lower status without a 
concern for reciprocity. Cultural beliefs and social norms that 
legitimate the higher status of certain members of that society would 
sustain such asymmetric exchanges. Similarly, the political and 
economic institutions of a centralized government operating in such a 
stratified society might extract payments from its citizens without 
providing direct reciprocation to each paying participant.133  
However, surveying the findings of numerous studies of 
reciprocity in different cultural settings, Gouldner observed: 
Not only does the norm of reciprocity play a stabilizing role in 
human relations in the absence of a well developed system of 
special status duties, but it contributes to social stability even 
when these are present and well established. Status duties 
 
 131. Schieffelin, supra note 122. 
 132. Id. at 513-15. 
 133. See, e.g., Orenstein, supra note 116, at 70-73. 
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shape behavior because the status occupant believes them 
binding in their own right; they possess a kind of prima facie 
legitimacy for properly socialized group members. The general 
norm of reciprocity, however, is a second-order defense of 
stability; it provides a further source of motivation and an 
additional moral sanction for conforming with specific status 
obligations.134 
Different elements of enculturated norms and collective ideologies 
can thus play out at multiple scales of interaction—from the policy 
rhetoric deployed by administrators of centralized redistribution to 
the decisions of conformity or deviation by individual participants in 
small-group interactions.135 
How might these insights from anthropological and sociological 
studies inform an analysis of taxpaying behavior in the United States? 
Experimental studies have already attempted to identify strategies 
corresponding to those used at the large and small scales of reciprocal 
interactions to legitimate centralized tax collection.136 The results 
suggest that trust in government and in other citizens buttresses tax 
compliance.137 However, additional work is necessary to augment and 
translate these insights into meaningful tax policy directives.  
In addition to the challenges of centralized collection presented by 
the American tax system, the system also, controversially, effects 
redistribution. The type of redistribution that receives the most 
attention—that from the better-off to the less well-off—presents 
sharp concerns about free riding.138 Here, too, we can see reactions 
that correspond to small and large scale strategies. On the one hand, 
we have seen the devolution of certain social welfare programs to the 
state and local level, a move premised, in part, on the supposed 
 
 134. Gouldner, supra note 123, at 175-76. 
 135. See, e.g., id.; GIDDENS, supra note 117, at 76-81. 
 136. See, e.g., John T. Scholz & Mark Lubell, Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic 
Approach to Collective Action, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 398 (1998).  
 137. Id. at 411-13. 
 138.  In fact, transfers to the poor constitute only a small subset of all societal redistribution. 
See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, ECONOMICS OF REDISTRIBUTION 1 (2d ed. 1997) (explaining that 
“if we use redistribution to mean all cases in which the government transfers funds or wealth 
from one group of people to another, it is a much larger phenomenon than the rather modest 
transfers to the poor”). 
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greater ability of local institutions to assess the needs and motives of 
would-be recipients.139 On the other hand, we see the use of rhetoric 
and social control mechanisms to legitimate these expenditures.140 
However, these strategies may be insufficient to overcome the 
perceived lapses of reciprocity that redistribution introduces into the 
tax system.  
To pinpoint these shortcomings, we must evaluate the American 
tax system in terms of its satisfaction of enculturated norms of 
reciprocity. In subpart B, we work through two models of exchange: 
the market exchange model, and a model of non-market reciprocity 
through repeat-play and gift-giving. The federal tax system does not 
fit comfortably within either of these templates. In subpart C, we 
consider how and whether certain components of reciprocity, or 
proxies for those components, might be introduced into the federal 
tax system.  
B. Markets and Other Reciprocal Exchanges 
1. Market Exchange 
The most familiar and ubiquitous form of bilateral exchange in 
modern, developed countries is the market exchange. One can also 
 
 139. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and 
Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1145-73 (2000) (discussing degree of 
discretion given to front-line administrative personnel in administering Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) and in making individual determinations about matters such as the 
needs and abilities to work of would-be recipients); see also Wax, supra note 98, at 270 
(explaining that “[t]he need to judge what persons seeking benefits can do or have done for 
themselves or others will drive a keen interest in the behavior and conduct of would-be 
beneficiaries”); supra Part III.B (discussing difficulty in distinguishing “needy riders” from 
“free riders”). 
 140. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), which 
replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with TANF, contained a number of 
rhetorical and structural features designed to address perceived problems with free riding, 
including the express disavowal of any person’s entitlement to benefits and the addition of work 
requirements, sanctions, and time limits. See HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, 106TH 
CONG., 2000 GREEN BOOK, SECTION 7: TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE TO NEEDY FAMILIES 352-54 
(Comm. Print 2000) (discussing these and other changes effected by the legislation); see 
generally FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE 
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (2d ed. 1993) (discussing historical control of welfare 
recipients). 
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conceive of taxes in these terms; indeed, the “benefit approach” to 
taxation does exactly that.141 However, there are two impediments to 
the use of this model in the federal taxation context. The first 
impediment arises from the rhetorical, temporal, and spatial 
separation of the collection function of government from the benefit-
providing functions of government.142 Only rarely do the collection 
and benefit sides of government unite in time and space, in a single 
interaction informed by coherent policy rhetoric. We do not know of 
any in-depth study of the psychological impact of putting money 
through a window and receiving a tangible representation of a benefit 
through that same window in return, but the sense of reciprocity 
engendered in the transaction must be much greater than in the 
typical taxpaying setting.143  
Other settings in which either rhetorical or actual connections 
have been drawn between payments and benefits include school bond 
issues, the earmarked use of lottery revenues,144 and the earmarking 
of payroll taxes for Social Security, Medicare, and Unemployment 
Insurance.145 Local governments have also employed the imagery of a 
 
 141. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 62 (1959) (“In the benefit 
approach, the relation of taxpayer and government is seen, as John Stuart Mill puts it, in quid 
pro quo terms. Since the relation is one of exchange, the rules of the public household are taken 
to be more or less the same as those of the market.”). 
 142. E.g., Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 179-83. 
 143. Examples of such “single-window” transactions include many forms of government-
issued licenses (e.g., licenses to hunt, fish, marry, operate a vehicle, keep a pet, or enter a public 
park). The individual’s control over the choice whether to engage in the underlying activity, and 
the evident value that the individual places on the privilege she is obtaining, likely make the 
interaction more palatable. See CUMMINGS ET AL., supra note 10, at 2 (reporting experimental 
results of laboratory investigations conducted with subjects in the United States, South Africa, 
and Botswana that “provide support for the hypothesis that tax compliance increases with 
individual perceptions that the tax system is fair and that the government is providing valued 
goods and services with the revenues”); id. at 6 n.7 (IRS survey results show “individuals react 
negatively to the perception that they have no control over the use of their taxes”); James Alm 
et al., Fiscal Exchange, Collective Decision Institutions and Tax Compliance, 22 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 285, 288 (1993) (reporting results of laboratory experiments showing tax 
compliance “is significantly higher when individuals vote on the use of their taxes than when 
the identical [spending plan] is imposed upon them”); cf. Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 229-30 
(suggesting media campaigns to emphasize public goods and services the federal government 
provides using tax revenues). 
 144.  See, e.g., CHARLES T. CLOTFELDER & PHILIP J. COOK, SELLING HOPE: STATE 
LOTTERIES IN AMERICA 227-28 (1989) (discussing the earmarking of state lottery revenues and 
the likelihood that it has little or no impact on spending patterns). 
 145.  See ROSEN, supra note 2, at 184-85, 196 (explaining that payroll taxes fund Social 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol13/iss1/4
p 75 Fennell.doc  9/22/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003]  Fear and Greed in Tax Policy 123 
 
unified exchange in campaigns to support the payment of taxes. For 
example, a 1934 Memphis advertising poster depicted a customer 
receiving a basket of identifiable public goods in exchange for his 
monetary payment.146 However, the federal income tax system lacks 
such connections. The efficiency justifications for agency 
specialization are obvious, but severance of all connections between 
the collection of taxes and the provision of benefits eliminates any 
semblance of a quid pro quo exchange.147  
The second difficulty is the aforementioned fear of free riding. 
The failure of some members of society to contribute their shares to 
the provision of the public good prevents the individual taxpayer 
from receiving full value for her money in the interaction. Indeed, the 
existence of free riders may independently generate disutility that 
makes the deal even worse in experiential terms than would be 
suggested by the gap between payments and benefits. Thus, even if it 
were possible to arrange matters so that people directly associated the 
benefits received with the taxes going into the system, taxpayers 
would still need reassurance that others had not contributed less while 
receiving more.148 A system that incorporates a measure of 
intentional redistribution, whether through transfer programs or 
through cross-subsidization built directly into the tax system in the 
form of progressivity and gaps in the tax base, cannot provide such 
assurance.149  
 
Security, Medicare, and Unemployment Insurance). 
 146. Poster from the 1934 the Memphis Pay Your Taxes Campaign, Good Merchandise 
Fairly Priced, U.S. MUN. NEWS, Oct. 1, 1935, reprinted in DAVID T. BEITO, TAXPAYERS IN 
REVOLT 122 (1989). 
 147. This is not to suggest that it would always be easy to draw rhetorical connections 
between government collections and expenditures. Some benefits generated by government 
expenditures take an indirect or intangible form that makes such connections more difficult to 
draw. For example, the direct benefits of welfare payments only go to the poor, but the 
payments yield an important set of ambient benefits for society as a whole (such as the chance 
to live in a society in which young children do not starve). Because these ambient benefits arise 
only indirectly from the government expenditures, non-poor individuals may have difficulty 
recognizing that they receive any benefit at all from the tax dollars spent on poverty relief.  
 148.  See Alm et al., supra note 143, at 290, 301 (showing tax compliance rates in 
laboratory experiments were highest when subjects could vote for how taxes were spent and 
were informed of widespread support for the public goods provided; the researchers inferred 
that subjects perceived that strong support for a good would translate into high rates of payment 
for that good by the other participants).  
 149. More explicitly drawing the connection between taxes and benefits could even 
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2. Wider Frames of Exchange 
We can best introduce another brand of exchange potentially 
implicated in public goods interactions by contrasting it with the 
market exchange model just discussed. Market exchanges often 
involve the immediate, anonymous exchange of a good or service for 
currency. The availability of a generalized medium of exchange that 
stores value (money) makes it unnecessary for the parties to an 
exchange to await the moment when each has something intrinsically 
valued by the other to complete the deal.150 Contracts offer a device 
for temporally offsetting the moves in the exchange,151 while 
products such as credit can further widen the time-span for 
performance. Notably, contract transactions accomplish all of these 
functions within the framework of a market-based interaction in 
which the individual identities of the participants are unimportant. 
Outside of the marketplace (and even within it, where repeat play 
is involved), exercises in reciprocity often diverge from this market-
based model of exchange. The time span between giving and 
receiving can widen without the aid of market products such as 
credit, or formal devices such as contracts. Factors like trust and 
reputation begin to play a role in sustaining the parties’ cooperation. 
Much anthropological and sociological literature analyzes gift 
exchange, which some view as a kind of slow-motion market 
transaction.152 
In other words, widening the frame of reference can often address 
the above-mentioned concerns with free riding.153 A degree of 
 
sharpen the sense of unfairness for some if these individuals learned how much they paid for 
particular benefits as compared to others. As a collateral matter, these individuals might 
fundamentally disagree with some of the ends of taxation, thereby widening the perceived 
margin between taxes paid and benefits received. 
 150. See supra note 122 (citing studies of market and commodity exchange structures). 
 151. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION 13-14 (1981) (discussing use of contracts to transform future exchange into 
present exchange); see also YORAM BARZEL, A THEORY OF THE STATE: ECONOMIC RIGHTS, 
LEGAL RIGHTS, AND THE SCOPE OF THE STATE 90-91 (2002) (discussing use of contracts to 
address exchange over time as opposed to immediate exchange); DENNIS C. MUELLER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 227 (1996) (discussing the same). 
 152. E.g., BOURDIEU, supra note 116, at 5-7; Kopytoff, supra note 121, at 68-69. 
 153. Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 
1311 (2002) (discussing the significance of how widely or narrowly one “frames” a given 
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patience or a broader view of the interaction can turn what might 
initially seem to be a case of free riding into a reciprocal move in an 
ongoing interaction. For example, one who invests time, effort, and 
money in helping a family member appears to make a bad deal if we 
look narrowly at the balance sheet at a given moment. However, 
examining the situation over time might reveal a more balanced 
picture in which the assisted family member becomes an assisting 
family member.  
Another way in which people in the real world “widen their 
frames” involves the recognition of benefits that they receive by 
helping those they care about. We speak here not of payback for 
earlier favors or the banking of future favors, but rather of a 
recognition that one’s own well-being is to some extent bound up 
with that of people to whom one has certain ties. Relatedly, members 
of small groups may feel their own successes belong, at least in part, 
to those who have participated in their lives, so that sharing does not 
as clearly involve a transformation of something that is strictly 
personal property into a transfer to another. 
Experimental literature and anthropological studies agree that 
small groups whose members readily identify with each other have an 
easier time sustaining cooperation. There are several reasons for this. 
First, informal pressures and social sanctions may be ineffective in 
large group settings.154 Relatedly, where the provision of public 
goods involves large disparate groups, as it does in the federal 
taxation context, individuals do not likely perceive themselves as 
cooperating with others in a meaningful sense. Equally unlikely is the 
perception that noncooperation in large-scale settings constitutes the 
sort of “free riding” that actually harms others.155 When a person does 
 
transaction in determining its constitutionality). 
 154. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 62 (1965) (positing that 
“[i]n general, social pressure and social incentives operate only in groups of smaller size, in the 
groups so small that the members can have face-to-face contact with one another”). 
 155. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS 87 (1968) 
(contending that the term “free rider” is something of a misnomer in large-number settings 
involving the provision of public goods because an individual “has no sensation of securing 
benefits at the expense of others in any personal manner”); see also EDNA ULLMANN-
MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 28-29 (1977) (describing the “condition of individual 
insignificance,” where each individual contribution is so small and difficult to trace that it 
appears to have no impact on the overall result, and where defection is “not at the personal 
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not perceive that her actions have a personal impact on other 
individuals, she will be less reluctant to free ride.156 Finally, members 
of a small, cohesive group will likely have a greater degree of 
interdependence in their utility functions than members of a larger 
group. 
Small-group settings also allow enormous transparency in the 
reciprocal interaction. Members of small groups can personally 
assess the motives and situations of the other players in a manner not 
possible in large group settings. For example, in our winter 
expedition example,157 the hatted players could easily perceive the 
equipment requirements of the hatless players, and the hatted players 
could assess whether the hatless players were strategically hatless or 
hatless through no fault of their own. Both the donors and the 
recipients could view the redistribution, and the donors could also 
monitor the recipients’ use of the donated hats. Moreover, the donors 
could assess the recipients’ action or inaction in the face of later 
opportunities to reciprocate.  
One might question whether the impersonal nature of the large 
scale setting makes free riding a less acute concern. Free riding is 
likely to be more commonplace in large group settings for the reasons 
noted, but might those settings involve a lesser degree of the psychic 
pain associated with being “suckered”? Little or no systematic study 
and analysis of this possibility exists. However, popular outcry over 
welfare—a program that involves a special category of perceived free 
riders—was an important catalyst of reform. Political animosity 
towards welfare has far outweighed the relatively small monetary 
expenditure associated with it, leading some to believe that the 
animosity stems not from the cost of the program but from the 
expectations regarding reciprocity.158 This suggests that the large 
group setting sheds the benefits that might make reciprocity more 
 
expense of any of the other participants and is moreover likely to go entirely unnoticed by 
them”). 
 156. ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note 155, at 29 (explaining that possible inhibitions 
about “the infliction of direct and personal damage on one’s partners” would not be operative in 
settings “where the condition of individual insignificance is satisfied”). 
 157. See supra Part II.B.  
 158. See, e.g., Wax, supra note 98, at 272-74; Fong et al., supra note 48, at 21. 
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viable without introducing any countervailing benefits in the form of 
lessened psychic pain and increased tolerance for free riding. 
C. Components and Proxies 
Even a superficial look at the federal tax system raises serious 
doubts about its ability to embody a robust notion of reciprocity. 
Taxation at the federal level does not remotely resemble strict “for 
value” market exchanges, given the fact that benefits are temporally, 
spatially, and rhetorically removed from payments. Moreover, the 
large numbers of people involved and the high social distance 
between them retards any move towards a wider-framed 
understanding of the reciprocal interaction. No ability exists to 
directly observe the motives or circumstances of other taxpayers or 
recipients, potentially sharpening concerns about free riding.159 At the 
same time, free riding becomes more attractive because taxpayers do 
not perceive it as personally harming other individuals. Finally, 
people will likely feel a strong sense of entitlement to their gross 
income.160  
Even if interjecting a stronger sense of reciprocity into the federal 
tax system would reduce tax aversion, the possibilities for doing so 
are significantly constrained. If we want to make progress, we must 
identify particular components found in reciprocal interactions and 
transplant them into the federal taxation arena, or, alternatively, find 
proxies for the features that exist in robust reciprocal interactions. For 
example, some recent and ongoing work investigates whether the 
Internal Revenue Service’s treatment of taxpayers affects compliance 
levels.161 This work incorporates notions of reciprocity by querying 
whether, for example, a courteous, fair, and helpful IRS triggers a 
reciprocal reaction from taxpayers in the form of heightened 
 
 159. See, e.g., ARMIN FALK & URS FISCHBACHER, A THEORY OF RECIPROCITY 20 (Ctr. for 
Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 457, 2001), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/000105406.pdf?abstractid=203115; Fehr & Gächter, 
supra note 37, at 162-63. 
 160. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 30, at 25-26, 30-36 (discussing claims of moral 
property rights in pretax income). 
 161. See, e.g., FREY & FELD, supra note 12, at 22-23; Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance 
and the Reformed IRS, 51 KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=391134. 
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compliance levels.  
Could the IRS potentially serve as a proxy for all of the other 
members of society who engage in the taxpaying game? If taxpayers 
viewed the agency as a composite “good citizen”—a fiscally aware 
“Smokey the Bear” type of character162—this might reduce the 
present, large-scale taxpaying game to a small-group (two-player) 
game between the taxpayer and the anthropomorphized agency. 
However, this approach has limits. While people might behave 
marginally better when treated well by an agency that has an 
attractive public image, some forms of free riding that may be of 
concern to taxpayers occur outside of the jurisdiction of the agency. 
In addition, a single-purpose agency devoted to collection of taxes 
might have difficulty fostering the sort of wide-frame view of the 
societal interaction that can make the interaction appear more 
reciprocal.  
Another feature alluded to above is that of transparency—the 
ability to see and evaluate the reciprocal moves. In small-group 
interactions, where voluntary contributions dominate, transparency is 
tightly linked to the notion of control. If a participant believes that the 
group interaction has become too imbalanced, she can simply stop 
contributing, secure in the knowledge that this punishes those 
individuals who failed to exhibit sufficient reciprocity in their 
dealings. In contrast, the uses made of tax money are less transparent. 
At a minimum, there are significant costs in learning where one’s 
dollars go. Political action affords only the bluntest form of control; 
each voter can only “purchase” a bundle of issue positions advocated 
by a given representative. In addition, the motives, circumstances, 
and contributions of the other members of society are not transparent.  
Certain kinds of transparencies, such as knowledge of where taxes 
go, and the amounts other contributors pay, could be enhanced in the 
federal tax system at relatively low cost. A remaining question, 
though, is whether heightened transparency does any good—or 
whether, indeed, it does harm—when presented in isolation from 
meaningful control. One might argue that knowing more about the 
 
 162. For background on Smokey the Bear and similar public service advertising 
campaigns, see PAUL RUTHERFORD, ENDLESS PROPAGANDA: THE ADVERTISING OF PUBLIC 
GOODS 26-29 (2000). 
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tax system actually makes people like it less. While the answer 
remains unclear, a possibility worth investigating is whether a proxy 
for control—the exercise of voice—might mitigate this concern. In 
other words, introducing a transparency-voice bundle into the federal 
taxation system might carry many of the advantages of the 
transparency-control bundle we see in successful small-group 
interactions.  
V. BUILDING A QUALITATIVE RESEARCH AGENDA 
In this final section of the paper, we present some possible ways 
of operationalizing the insights gleaned from existing empirical 
literature as it relates to the phenomenon of tax aversion. However, as 
we have noted throughout the paper, the existing empirical literature 
contains many gaps. There is little or no direct work on the 
phenomena that most interests us—the contours, dynamics, causes, 
and cures of tax aversion. As the anthropological and behavioral 
literature emphasizes, context is critically important, and one cannot 
simply lift lessons from one experimental context and apply them to 
the very different context of federal taxation. In keeping with this 
understanding of the limits of the existing work, we do not present 
the ideas in this section as policy proposals for immediate universal 
adoption. Rather, we mean to provide tentative sketches for 
experimental designs that might be attempted, perhaps as pilot 
programs, in the federal taxation context. 
 A. Transparent Taxpaying 
One could design programs to test the effects of making taxpaying 
more transparent to taxpayers. We have in mind two distinct sorts of 
transparency. The first involves making the use of specific tax 
monies transparent to taxpayers. Even an extraordinarily motivated 
taxpayer would encounter great difficulty in attempting to learn 
where her income tax dollars go. Federal income tax instruction 
booklets do contain an “outlay” pie chart that shows the breakdown 
of the federal budget.163 Yet this budget shows overall federal 
 
 163. Internal Revenue Service, 2002 1040 Instructions 2 (2002), available at 
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expenditures; it does not show only the expenditures funded by the 
income tax. Payroll taxes, which fund a specific slate of social 
benefits, account for thirty-five percent of federal receipts.164 Because 
the “outlay” pie chart includes expenditures funded by payroll taxes 
as well as expenditures funded by income taxes, an individual 
glancing at the chart might misapprehend the proportion of her 
income tax dollars flowing to various programs.165  
A taxpayer who undertakes to construct her own pie chart 
showing only the uses made of income tax receipts will find this a 
daunting task. Like the instruction booklet pie chart, the official 
budget documents break down expenditures in various ways but do 
not provide a functional breakdown of the expenditures funded only 
by the income tax.166 Therefore, a taxpayer would have to know 
which programs income tax does not fund, identify and subtract the 
amounts of the related budget lines, and calculate overall percentages 
for each category and subcategory based on the remaining totals. This 
would require many tedious hours poring over government 
documents and making calculations. Only after painstakingly 
calculating percentages for each function funded by the income tax 
could a taxpayer apply these percentages to her own income tax bill 
to determine how the government spends her income tax dollars. This 
level of non-transparency is stunning, given the relative ease with 
which the government could provide this information to taxpayers.167  
 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040gi.pdf.  
 164. See id. (providing “income” chart). 
 165. The misconceptions potentially generated by this pie chart are highly significant if we 
think that redistribution of the sort that accompanies social programs raises heightened fears 
about free riding.  
 166. See Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States 
Government, Fiscal Year 2004, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/ 
fy2004/pdf/hist.pdf (providing detailed tables showing government outlays broken down by 
function, category, and agency; and showing breakdowns of government receipts by source; but 
showing no functional breakdown of just the subset of expenditures funded by the income tax). 
Some organizations provide online charts and other information regarding the uses made of 
federal income tax revenue, but a taxpayer encountering these breakdowns would have to 
independently investigate and assess the validity of the data and the methodology used to 
achieve these results, and consider the extent to which the results might be influenced by each 
group’s political objectives. These concerns are not entirely avoided when a governmental body 
provides the breakdown, but they are minimized by the use of official data, standard category 
terms, and generally accepted methods of aggregating and presenting data.  
 167. Oregon, for example, provides the breakdown of its use of income tax revenues in a 
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While a simple printed pie chart showing the uses of income tax 
monies would provide a major advance, the ubiquity of computerized 
tax preparation software makes an even more transparent interface 
feasible. For example, after a taxpayer completes an income tax 
return on a computer168 a software program could easily provide a pie 
chart showing the percentages of income tax revenue dedicated to 
various functions and applying those percentages to the taxpayer’s 
annual income tax bill. This would inform a taxpayer exactly how 
many of her dollars flow to each governmental function. The 
software could initially present taxpayers with a pie chart showing 
broad categories of federal income tax expenditures. By clicking on a 
slice of the pie, a taxpayer would reach subsidiary charts showing 
expenditure details. At an appropriate level of detail, the taxpayer 
would encounter links to government webpages describing the 
individual tax-funded program.  
Another type of transparency that might be built into such a 
software program involves other taxpayers’ actions. The government 
could easily provide taxpayers with information (perhaps based on a 
previous year’s taxes) indicating the median and mean dollar amount 
of taxes people in various income strata and household configurations 
pay. A computer interface could personalize this information by 
telling an individual taxpayer whether her tax contribution falls above 
or below the median or mean amount of taxes for someone in her 
income range and filing status.169 This interface could even indicate 
the percentile into which the taxpayer falls. Again, while a taxpayer 
could theoretically construct this information from publicly-available 
data, building it directly into the tax preparation context would 
dramatically lower the costs of obtaining this information. 
 
user-friendly format online. Oregon Department of Revenue, Services Paid for with Oregon 
Income Tax Dollars (Fiscal Year 2001-02), at http://www.dor.state.or.us/taxInfo/Poster.html. 
 168. The IRS has recently launched a new internet-based electronic filing program 
designed to reach a majority of American taxpayers. Internal Revenue Service, Free File, at 
http://www.irs.gov/app/freeFile/welcome.jsp; see Alex Frangos, Use the Web to File Taxes, 
WALL ST. J., SUNDAY (available in THE ADVOCATE & GREENWICH TIME) Jan. 19, 2003, at F3.  
 169.  Tax preparation software has already begun to provide this information. The 2002 
edition of TurboTax® Deluxe contains a feature called “U.S. Averages Comparison” that 
compares the individual taxpayer’s earned income, other income, itemized deductions, and tax 
liability with those of others in her adjusted gross income range, using year 2000 IRS data 
adjusted by a consumer price index factor. 
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We could then study the effects of this pilot project on the amount 
and quality of tax aversion. On the one hand, the program could more 
concretely connect benefits with tax payments, perhaps making the 
interaction feel more reciprocal. It might also correct common 
misperceptions. For example, a person who has long resented 
taxation because she imagines that most of her tax money flows to 
“lazy” welfare recipients might view taxation differently when she 
learns how few of her tax dollars actually go to the welfare program. 
It might also allow an individual to see she is not a “sucker” 
contributing to the tax system while everyone else free rides. Thus, 
transparency might enhance the legitimacy of the governmental 
agencies responsible for collecting and spending funds, while 
simultaneously increasing compliance levels. 170  
On the other hand, the possibility exists that greater transparency 
might actually lead to greater hostility regarding taxpaying as 
taxpayers learn exactly how much of their money flows to programs 
they do not support and as they learn with greater precision the 
degree to which their own contributions subsidize others (whether 
recipients of redistributive programs, or fellow contributors who pay 
smaller amounts in tax).171 Yet, absolute levels of tax aversion may 
matter less than the practical consequences of that aversion. While 
the analysis in this paper suggests that tax aversion typically takes the 
socially destructive forms of avoidance, evasion, and unfocused 
disutility, the possibility remains that tax aversion could be 
“functional” in the sense that it motivates people to take political 
action aimed at rectifying perceived problems in public finance. In 
other words, disutility can function in a democracy much like pain in 
a physiological system, alerting the actor to take ameliorative steps to 
avoid permanent damage.172  
 
 170. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 66-71 (1993) (discussing the 
importance of publicity in legitimating governmental institutions); Tom R. Tyler, Justice, Self-
Interest, and the Legitimacy of Legal and Political Authority, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 171 
(Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) (discussing the impact of government legitimacy on citizen 
compliance).  
 171. See McCaffery, supra note 1, at 1874-86 (suggesting that hidden taxes may be more 
palatable to taxpayers). 
 172. See ROBERT E. LANE, THE LOSS OF HAPPINESS IN MARKET DEMOCRACIES 230 (2000) 
(arguing that expressions of pain in a democratic system can serve “to make that system more 
responsive to popular needs and demands”).  
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But aversion, like pain, is only useful to the extent that it prompts 
useful corrective action. Because corrective action requires 
information, one benefit of transparency is the improved political 
efficacy of the citizenry.173 Hence, we would not expect or want a 
transparent tax system to merely generate hedonic gains for 
taxpayers, but rather to transform aversion that is now blindly 
directed towards taxation in general into political sentiments that are 
more finely focused, and hence potentially more functional. Rather 
than simply feeling vaguely cheated by the system, taxpayers could 
address the specific programs (or particular features of the tax 
system) that engender a sense of waste or unfairness. 
Two issues threaten to puncture this optimistic vision. First, it is 
questionable how much difference any taxpayer’s angst can make (no 
matter how finely tuned) in a system in which majoritarian 
preferences are arguably subordinated to interest group politics. 
Second, given the fact that an individual taxpayer can do virtually 
nothing about a particular source of angst, one might question the 
extent to which taxpayers will even bother to examine the uses of 
their tax money. The next section offers a potential mechanism for 
addressing these concerns. 
B. Adding Voice: “The Taxpayer’s Budget” 
We hypothesize that a meaningful taxpayer “voice” might 
alleviate the concerns about powerlessness by serving as a proxy for 
taxpayer control. To test this hypothesis, we propose adding an 
additional interactive feature to the interface in the pilot project 
described above. We contemplate a simple software program that 
enables taxpayers to move seamlessly from a “budget-viewing” mode 
into a “budget-making” mode. In “budget-making” mode, taxpayers 
could express their budgetary preferences by revising the pie chart 
 
 173. See, e.g., Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 603, 605-08 (2003) (discussing the importance of information in a democracy); 
Kenneth W. Gideon, Assessing the Income Tax: Transparency, Simplicity, Fairness, 25 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 101, 102 (1999) (discussing advantages of transparency in tax rules); see also 
Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax Competition, 
89 GEO. L.J. 543, 600-03 (2001) (discussing impact of increased transparency on tax avoidance 
schemes in various jurisdictions). 
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(and the subsidiary pie charts subsumed within each slice) to reflect 
their preferred allocations of their tax dollars.174 We contemplate an 
intuitive interface that permits a taxpayer to use a computer mouse to 
grab the edge of a given pie slice and widen or narrow it. For each 
such move, the taxpayer could have the option of automatically 
readjusting every other slice proportionally or of making additional 
adjustments manually.  
Of course, we do not contemplate allowing taxpayers to directly 
control the budget in this fashion; the interface would make very 
clear to the taxpayer that the “budget-making” mode merely conveys 
information about the taxpayer’s preferred allocation. However, the 
government could aggregate all of the individual allocations (or a 
representative sample) to construct a publicly-available “taxpayer’s 
budget” that shows how taxpayers would spend tax dollars, if given 
the power. If the news media compared this aggregate against the real 
budget, it could serve as a focal point for public discourse and 
political debate, potentially influencing government spending 
patterns. This dynamic could conceivably operate as a counterweight 
to any real or perceived dominance of the political process by special 
interest groups. We might also expect this program to encourage 
some improvements in public relations work among governmental 
agencies, in an effort to win a vote of confidence from the 
citizenry.175  
Operationalizing this idea, even within the context of a limited 
experimental program, would require us to address several 
fundamental questions. First, we would need to decide on the basis of 
 
 174. At least one experimental study found that subjects allowed to choose between two 
options for expenditures of the group funds to which they had contributed, experienced 
increased satisfaction with the taxation and expenditure system in which they participated. Alm 
et al., supra note 143. The budget allocation we propose here would offer participants a greater 
array of choices. Perhaps suggesting the appeal of such an approach, our hometown newspaper, 
the Austin American-Statesman, has recently created an interactive online “budget game” to 
accompany its coverage of the 78th Texas Legislature. See The Budget Game, 
http://www.statesman.com/insight/content/norails/budget_game. The game enables people to 
choose the budget cuts and new revenue sources that they would use to bridge the state’s 
budgetary shortfall, and provides commentary on the likely political fallout associated with 
each choice. See Gary Susswein & Juan B. Elizondo, Jr., Play the Budget Game!, AUSTIN 
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Apr. 13, 2003, p. E1 (explaining the game and providing a hard copy 
version).  
 175. Alm et al., supra note 143, at 301-02. 
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our “taxpayer’s budget.” We could base the budget on the “dollar 
votes” of taxpayers so that the chosen allocations of someone with 
more tax dollars to allocate would have more weight in the aggregate 
pie chart. Another approach would give equal weight to the 
preferences of each taxpayer, regardless of the amount of tax she 
pays.176 
There are political and philosophical arguments for both the 
“dollar vote” and the “equal vote” approaches. Giving those who pay 
larger amounts a “louder” voice in any political arena may seem 
morally repugnant at first blush, but the case for doing so grows 
stronger if we think that part of what fuels tax aversion is a concern 
with cross-subsidization. Moreover, if one believes that those with 
more money already have a louder voice, a tax-dollar-based 
aggregation would not necessarily yield results more “pro-rich” than 
those already produced by the current political process. A 
compromise approach would make the data publicly available in both 
forms, first aggregated by tax dollars, and separately aggregated on a 
one-person one-vote principle.177 The political process could then 
decide which, if either, of these compilations should inform policy.178 
It is even possible that a backlash could develop against “the rich 
people’s budget” if it transparently appears to embody “pocketbook 
voting.”179  
A related concern is that taxpayers, as a group, are not necessarily 
representative of the nation as a whole, because not everyone pays 
federal income taxes. Linking the interface to tax return filings will 
thus automatically miss a segment of the population that is especially 
vulnerable and politically underrepresented.180 However, the fact that 
 
 176.  We thank David Schizer for prompting us to focus on the implications of this design 
choice. 
 177. To alleviate the concerns about non-taxpayers, we might allow any person eligible to 
vote to submit an allocation, even when they do not file a tax return. This would be counted in 
the latter aggregation, but not in the former one. 
 178. There are a number of other details that we would have to address. For example, we 
might permit married couples filing joint returns to create separate allocations for one-half of 
the tax payment amount, or choose to allocate the entire amount together (counting as two 
separate allocations for purposes of the one-person, one-vote budget). 
 179. See, e.g., David O. Sears & Carolyn L. Funk, Self-Interest in Americans’ Political 
Opinions, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 147, 156-57 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) (discussing 
and questioning the “pocketbook voting” hypothesis). 
 
 180. The specific “voice” mechanism contemplated here—a computer interface—might 
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many people of limited means file tax returns to claim refunds and to 
receive the Earned Income Tax Credit significantly alleviates this 
concern. Of course, many of these people do not pay any positive 
amount in federal income taxes,181 which raises the issue of the 
appropriateness of a “dollar votes” approach even more sharply. 
Another interesting question is whether government should permit 
all allocational moves, or whether it should disallow certain moves. 
For example, the interface might prevent a taxpayer from reducing 
the amount of money allocated to debt service, or the interface might 
allow the taxpayer to do this if she chooses, but only after responding 
to a pop-up warning about the risk and significance of government 
default. We tend to favor the latter approach, because we fear that 
moves in the direction of carving out “untouchable” categories of 
expenditures could dilute taxpayer voice and its corresponding ability 
to serve as a proxy for taxpayer control. 
Our proposed interface would provide taxpayers with a form of 
voice presently unavailable to them. While taxpayers are already free 
to engage in political action, the realities of bundled choices and 
interest group politics make any real involvement illusory. Likewise, 
the current system severely limits taxpayers’ ability to seek judicial 
relief regarding the use of their tax monies.182 In some tax-related 
contexts, the ability to exercise voice appears quite important to 
taxpayer perceptions, and there is reason to suspect it might be 
significant in this context as well.183 At any rate, there is nothing lost, 
and potentially much gained, by investigating these questions.184 
 
also seem to leave out those on the wrong side of the “digital divide.” However, it would be 
possible to address this concern by setting up public tax centers at libraries and other 
community centers that would provide free use of computers and software for this purpose, and 
by providing paper forms in which respondents could list desired allocations.  
 181. The Earned Income Tax Credit is a “refundable” tax credit, which means that eligible 
recipients receive the credit even when it exceeds any positive amount of taxes. ROSEN, supra 
note 2, at 166.  
 182. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 169-70 (1974) (discussing 
taxpayer standing requirements). 
 183. Richard Lempert, Commentary, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT 251, 254 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (“Probably the strongest and most powerful 
factor that leads to judgments of fair procedure is ‘voice,’ the ability to state one’s case or tell a 
story to a decision maker”).  
 184. Cf. id. (suggesting that modifying tax returns “so that they provided an opportunity to 
speak to the government” would be “an experiment well worth doing”).  
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CONCLUSION 
The phenomenon of tax aversion is elusive, yet of great practical 
and theoretical significance. We have attempted to convince readers 
of the value that might be gained from employing empirical tools to 
pin down the phenomenon, to understand its constituent parts, and to 
evaluate how it might be alleviated. Because the paper seeks to open 
up new lines of inquiry that can inform tax design, this “conclusion” 
concludes nothing; we offer merely a starting point.  
We close with a brief note about interdisciplinarity. This paper, 
like many interdisciplinary papers involving law, seems at first blush 
to reflect a unidirectional notion of interdisciplinarity. On this view, 
the law (which has plenty of unsolved problems but few answers of 
its own) eagerly pries open the treasure chests of other disciplines 
and attempts to pilfer transferable lessons from them. The 
anthropological and sociological literature, however, comes with 
built-in warnings attached, reminding us that findings in one context 
do not readily transfer to other contexts; anthropology is, in a sense, 
all about understanding the ways in which context shapes human 
choice. Anthropology’s contributions to federal taxation cannot be 
realized in a manner consistent with the discipline’s own operating 
principles until anthropologists begin to apply the tools of the 
discipline to those specific cultural contexts.  
Thus, this paper identifies a gap not only in legal scholarship but 
also in the anthropological literature. One might think that 
anthropological studies would have thoroughly covered aspects of 
human and societal life as integral as taxpaying and public finance, 
but this is not the case. Where we expected to find a rich stock of 
accumulated theory and empirical data, we encountered mostly bare 
cupboards.185 Our ambitious hope, then, is that this paper advances 
not only public policy dialogue about taxation and legal scholarship, 
 
 185. Recent anthropological studies have examined cultural and social dynamics among 
welfare recipients and social workers. See, e.g., Jo Anne Schneider, Introduction: Social 
Welfare and Welfare Reform, 103 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 705 (2001). Still, broader issues of 
taxation and spending remain new terrain to be addressed. 
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but also helps to advance anthropological studies by opening up a 
relatively untapped field of inquiry that seems to have significant 
implications for the discipline. 
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